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information and disinformation in the online environment. Part III provides
a survey and taxonomy of ongoing responses to vaccine misinformation
adopted by mainstream social media. It further notes the limitations of
current self-regulatory modes and illustrates these limitations by presenting
a short case study on Facebook—the largest social media vehicle for vaccinespecific misinformation, currently estimated to harbor approximately half of
the social media accounts linked to vaccine misinformation. Part IV examines
potential ways to improve stringency of ongoing modes of self-regulation of
vaccine misinformation, as well as the creation of cooperative monitoring
and mutual assistance networks dedicated to addressing issues specific to the
field of vaccine misinformation.
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INTRODUCTION
The world is everything that is the case.
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all
the facts.
For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and
also all that is not the case.
The facts in logical space are the world.
The world divides into facts.
(…)
What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921)

The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history
of irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error. But science is one
of the very few human activities — perhaps the only one — in which
errors are systematically criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected.
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This is why we can say that, in science, we often learn from our
mistakes, and why we can speak clearly and sensibly about making
progress there.
– Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge (1963)
Vaccine hesitancy – the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate despite the
availability of vaccines – threatens to reverse progress made in
tackling vaccine-preventable diseases.
– World Health Organization, Top Ten Threats to Global
Health in 2019 (adding vaccine hesitancy to the list)

The circulation of inaccurate information among national and
transnational communities has been documented throughout history. 1 A more
recent development has been the use of online pathways to propagate
inaccurate information on increasingly larger scales. 2 The popularization of
social media, in particular, has significantly accelerated and amplified the
spread of misinformation.3 This growth has left virtually no field untouched,
from discourses on political and electoral themes to climate change, finance
and pop culture.4
1

See Robert Darnton, The True History of Fake News, N.Y. BOOK REV. (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/13/the-true-history-of-fake-news/
(“[T]he
equivalent of today’s poisonous, bite-size texts and tweets can be found in most periods of
history, going back to the ancients.”).
2
U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., JOURNALISM, ‘FAKE NEWS’ & DISINFORMATION:
HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISM EDUCATION AND TRAINING 17 (2018) (“Increasingly, it is also
possible to engineer audio and video in ways that go beyond legitimate news editing in order
to make it appear that a particular individual said or did something in some place, and to pass
this off as an authentic record . . . .”).
3
See Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spreading of Misinformation Online, 113 PNAS
554, 554 (2016) (“[T]he World Wide Web (WWW) also allows for the rapid dissemination
of unsubstantiated rumors and conspiracy theories that often elicit rapid, large, but naive
social responses . . . .”).
4
See generally CAILIN O'CONNOR & JAMES OWEN WEATHERALL, THE
MISINFORMATION AGE 3 (2018) (“[A]bout six weeks before Donald Trump was elected
president of the United States, a website calling itself ETF News (endingthefed.com) posted
a story with the headline ‘Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President,
Releases Statement.’”); Claire Wardle, Misinformation Has Created a New World Disorder,
SCI. AM. (2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/misinformation-has-created-anew-world-disorder/ (“misleading and conspiratorial content did not begin with the 2016
presidential race, and it will not end after”); Shimon Kogan et al., Social Media and Financial
News Manipulation 5 (Sept. 15, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237763 (“Misleading
information can impact social, political, and economic relationships.”); Kathie M. d'I. Treen
et al., Online Misinformation About Climate Change, WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE (Jun. 18,
2020), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.665 (“Once in the public
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In recent years, levels of hesitancy towards vaccines have been increasing
in many areas of the globe, but especially among Western countries. 5 The
reasons for this increase are multi-factorial and are not solely attributable to
the growing circulation of misinformation specifically focused on vaccinerelated themes.6 However, the accelerated and virtually unencumbered
dissemination of vaccine misinformation in the online environment—and
particularly through social media—has profoundly reshaped this area. 7 It has
facilitated and accelerated the creation of like-minded communities; provided
renewed visibility to vaccine-questioning and anti-vaccine discourses;
reoriented many of the efforts of anti-vaccine activists towards online and
social media channels; and attracted the attention of a broader category of
players, who seek to increase demand for, and monetize the purchase of,
“alternative” health goods, and which now populate social media with antivaccine or vaccine-questioning accounts.8
Vaccine misinformation has been exponentially exacerbated through use
(and misuse) of the manifold avenues for the dissemination of content opened
up by the popularization of social media.9 As seen in Part II, the online
circulation of vaccine misinformation has now been linked to the growth of
vaccine mistrust and hesitancy. Addressing the public health and
technological paradox posed by insufficient uptake of available vaccines thus
domain, characteristics of online social networks . . . provide fertile ground for
misinformation to spread” about climate change).
5
See Peter Hotez, America and Europe’s New Normal: The Return of VaccinePreventable Diseases, 85 PEDIATRIC RES. 912, 912 (2019) (“Heading into 2019 we are
seeing a return of vaccine-preventable diseases in Europe and the United States, much of it
because of well-organized, well-funded, and mostly unopposed antivaccine groups and
lobbies . . . .”).
6
See generally Daniel A. Salmon et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: Causes, Consequences, and
a Call to Action, 49 AM. J. PREV. MED. S391, S391 (2015), https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/abs/pii/S0749379715003141 (“There is a broad range of factors contributing
to vaccine hesitancy, including the compulsory nature of vaccines, their coincidental
temporal relationships to adverse health outcomes, unfamiliarity with vaccine-preventable
diseases, and lack of trust in corporations and public health agencies.”).
7
See generally Andis Robeznieks, Stopping the Scourge of Social Media
Misinformation on Vaccines, AM. MED. ASS’N (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/public-health/stopping-scourge-social-media-misinformationvaccines (“It is common that patient searches for information and products related to the
word ‘vaccine’ yield top results pointing to harmfully inaccurate information about
immunization safety. This place of prominence given to medical disinformation is deeply
troubling to America’s physicians, especially amid alarming new reports regarding measles,
tetanus and other vaccine-preventable conditions.”).
8
See infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
9
See, e.g., Robeznieks, supra note 7 (“The [American Medical Association] sent a letter
to top executives at Amazon, Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Twitter and YouTube urging
them to do even more to stem the ‘proliferation’ of ‘health-related misinformation’ that has
helped vaccine-preventable diseases to reemerge.”).
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requires considering how vaccine misinformation propagates online; how
this propagation has been instrumentalized by actors with certain ideological
or monetization purposes, or both; and the policy and legal options available
to curb the spread of vaccine misinformation.
This essay begins exploring these topics by explaining how the
intertwined phenomena of vaccine trust and vaccine hesitancy are presently
shaped by the recent spur in the circulation of inaccurate content about
vaccines in mainstream social media. Part III provides a survey and taxonomy
of recent and ongoing responses to vaccine misinformation from mainstream
social media and online social networks. It further notes the limitations of
current self-regulatory modes and illustrates these limitations by presenting
a short case study about Facebook—the largest social media vehicle for
vaccine-specific misinformation, currently estimated to harbor
approximately half of the social media accounts linked to vaccine
misinformation. Part IV examines potential ways to improve stringency of
ongoing modes of self-regulation of vaccine misinformation, as well as the
creation of cooperative monitoring and mutual assistance networks dedicated
to addressing issues specific to the field of vaccine misinformation.
A framing note: while multiple definitions of these phenomena populate
the literature,10 the term “misinformation” has come to be broadly understood
as the dissemination of false or misleading content.11 A growing number of
commentators treat the phenomenon of “disinformation” separately to
reference situations in which such dissemination is done with the deliberate
purpose of sowing doubt around a particular topic or increasing discord
among holders of competing opinions or worldviews. 12This essay uses the
word “misinformation” as an umbrella term to denote the existence of
inaccuracies in vaccine-related content, irrespective of intent. Throughout the
essay, the word “disinformation” is reserved for cases in which there is an
intent to deceive in the dissemination of inaccurate vaccine-related content;
and in which it references a source that adopts the word as an umbrella term
itself—as is the case of the European Union’s policy in this area. 13
10

See, e.g., Emily K. Vraga & Leticia Bode, Defining Misinformation and
Understanding its Bounded Nature: Using Expertise and Evidence for Describing
Misinformation, 37 POL. COMM. 136, 136 (2020) (“[D]efining ‘misinformation’ in a
consistent and coherent way has been a challenge for the field.”).
11
Gordon Pennycook et al., Understanding and Reducing the Spread of Misinformation
Online, 592 NATURE 590, 590 (2021).
12
Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an
interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making, Council Eur. Rep.
DGI(2017)09, at 16 (Sept. 27, 2017) (“The term ‘fake news’ has also begun to be
appropriated by certain politicians and commentators to describe news organizations whose
coverage they find disagreeable.”).
13
See infra, Part IV.A.
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However, instead of adopting the umbrella expression “anti-vaccine,” the
essay distinguishes between instances of anti-vaccine discourses (statements
that directly contradict current scientific consensus about the safety and
efficacy of vaccines, or that promote vaccine refusal) and vaccinequestioning discourses (statements from individuals or organizations seeking
more information about vaccines)14 to mirror the range of behaviors and
motivations is this ideologically charged area.

I. A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM: VACCINE MISINFORMATION, TRUST
AND HESITANCY
A. A Public Health Paradox
Vaccines have long been regarded as one of the most cost-effective public
health preparedness tools, playing an instrumental role in the prevention of
outbreaks of infectious diseases,15 as well as in the response to ongoing
outbreaks, as presently illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic
Outside the context of highly disruptive—and often sudden—large-scale
public health crises, robust administration of vaccines recommended by
public health authorities not only improves public health outcomes, but also
results in considerable savings to health systems, as well as in positive
externalities for different economic sectors. 16 Recent estimates from the
World Health Organization indicate that vaccination prevents between two
and three million deaths per year across the globe.17 A study analyzing
vaccination practices in the U.S. found that vaccinating around four million
infants helps prevent 42,000 early deaths and twenty million cases of
illness.18 The study also calculated that avoidance of death and illness in this

14
Examples include individuals or organizations interrogating the safety of COVID-19
vaccines, which were developed according to a timeline perceived by the general public as
exceptional.
15
Sachiko Ozawa et al., Return On Investment From Childhood Immunization In LowAnd Middle-Income Countries, 2011–20, 35 HEALTH AFF. 199, 199 (2016).
16
Vanessa Rémy et al., Vaccination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare
System, 3 J. MRT. ACCESS HEALTH & POL'Y. 1, 1 (2015) (“[The] health effects [of vaccines]
translate into positive economic results, as vaccination can provide significant savings by
avoiding the direct and indirect costs associated with treating the disease and possible longterm disability. A recent US study estimated that every dollar spent on childhood vaccination
could save US$4 from a payer perspective and US$10 from a societal perspective.”).
17
WORLD HEALTH ORG., Immunization coverage (2020), https://www.who.int/en/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/immunization-coverage.
18
Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization
Program in the United States, 2009, 133 PEDIATRICS 577, 577 (2014).
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context would translate into $13.5 billion savings in net direct costs, 19 as well
as $68.8 billion in net savings in societal costs.20
While there are several vaccine-preventable diseases for which we
currently lack commercially available vaccines, 21 the number of vaccines
targeting new diseases available to indicated populations has increased
steadily from the mid-twentieth century onwards, leading to the eradication
or near-eradication of many devastating diseases, as well as to significant
reductions in the burden of many others .22
In recent years, however, wavering trust in vaccines has been deemed one
of the most significant contributing factors towards declining rates of
vaccination, particularly across the Western world. 23 Problems of trust related
to health technologies, and in particular vaccines, are not new. Different
communities have historically challenged the public health value, safety and
efficacy of vaccines, even when presented with the best available scientific
evidence supporting the use of a given vaccine, and of vaccines in general, as
further described in Part II.24
Periods of heightened vaccine mistrust are linked to increased behavioral
hesitancy affecting the timely administration of recommended vaccines to

19

Id. at 577. This category encompasses the costs of medical treatment, as well as of
non-medical interventions, such as the costs associated with special education services
necessary for children suffering from disabilities. Id.
20
This category encompasses productivity losses and opportunity costs resulting from
contracting a vaccine-preventable disease or caring for children suffering from a vaccinepreventable disease. Id.
21
See Stanley A. Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund, 373
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 297, 297 (2015) (“[W]e still lack a vaccine [for Ebola] that has been
shown to be safe and effective.”).
22
ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST
LIFESAVER 50 (2007); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY (2006); see also
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Vaccines Licensed for Use in the United States (Dec. 1, 2021)
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/vaccines-licensed-use-united-states
(listing currently licensed vaccines in the United States).
23
See Walter A. Orenstein et al., Assessing the State of Vaccine Confidence in the United
States: Recommendations from the National Vaccine Advisory Committee, 130 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 573, 574-75 (2015) (“Reluctance, hesitation, concerns, or a lack of confidence has
caused some parents to question or forgo recommended vaccines.”); Heather MacDougall &
Laurence Monnais, Vaccinating in the Age of Apathy: Measles Vaccination in Canada 1963–
1998, 190 CAN. J. MED. ASS’N E399, E399 (2018) (“[L]ack of uptake meant that vaccination
was “a battleground where apathy is [a] greater enemy than disease.); Heidi Larson et al.,
State of Vaccine Confidence in the European Union in 2018, 29 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 141,
141 (2019) (“We find that most age groups under 65 surveyed have less confidence in the
safety and importance of both the MMR and seasonal influenza vaccines (and vaccines
generally) than over 65’s.”).
24
See generally JONATHAN M. BERMAN, ANTI-VAXXERS: HOW TO CHALLENGE A
MISINFORMED MOVEMENT (2020).
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indicated patients.25 The World Health Organization currently defines
“vaccine hesitancy” as the “reluctance or refusal to vaccinate despite the
availability of vaccines.”26 In 2019, the World Health Organization added
vaccine hesitancy to the list of the top ten threats to global health. 27
We thus face a technological paradox with salient implications for public
health and preparedness frameworks.28 Notwithstanding the broad
availability of health technologies that can prevent or lessen the burden of
vaccine-preventable diseases, mistrust and hesitancy towards these
technologies hamper their deployment as tools of public health. 29 As a result,
vaccine-preventable diseases for which a vaccine is available are making a
comeback. The 2019 outbreaks of measles across the United States, for
example, have been directly linked to growing hesitancy towards childhood
vaccines that have been recommended by public health authorities,
commercialized, and administered for decades. 30
During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health authorities in the United
States have had to contend with sub-optimal levels of public trust in newly
developed vaccines, a phenomenon that continues to cast doubts on whether
ongoing vaccine manufacturing and vaccination efforts will be enough to
reach the critical mass required to achieve herd immunity within projected
25

See Eve Dubé et al., Vaccine Hesitancy, Vaccine Refusal and the Anti-Vaccine
Movement: Influence, Impact and Implications, 14 EXP. REV. VACCINES 99, 100 (2015)
(“Vaccine-hesitant parents may refuse some vaccines, but agree to others; they may delay
vaccines or accept them according to the recommended schedule, but feel unsure in doing
so.”).
26
WORLD HEALTH ORG./Rada Akbar, TEN THREATS TO GLOBAL HEALTH IN 2019,
https://www.who.int/news-room/spotlight/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019 (last visited
Dec. 19, 2021).
27
Id.
28
See CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Public Health Emergency
Preparedness and Response Capabilities: National Standards for State, Local, Tribal, and
Territorial Public Health (Jan. 25, 2021, 3:15 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/readiness/
capabilities.htm (“Community preparedness is the ability of communities to prepare for,
withstand, and recover from public health incidents in both the short and long term.”).
29
See, e.g., Saad B. Omer et al., Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the
Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 361 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2009) (“[T]he
success of an immunization program depends on high rates of acceptance and coverage.”);
id. (“[P]ublic concern about real or perceived adverse events associated with vaccines has
increased. This heightened level of concern often results in an increase in the number of
people refusing vaccines.”).
30
See David A. Broniatowski et al., Facebook Pages, the “Disneyland” Measles
Outbreak, and Promotion of Vaccine Refusal as a Civil Right, 2009–2019, 110 AM. J PUB.
HEALTH S312, S312 (2020) (“Activity in pages promoting vaccine choice as a civil liberty
increased in January 2015, April 2016, and January 2019 . . . . The ‘Disneyland’ measles
outbreak drew vaccine opposition into the political mainstream, followed by promotional
campaigns conducted in pages framing vaccine refusal as a civil right.”).
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timelines.31 This provides a stark contrast with the vaccine trust environment
that characterized earlier vaccine races. The strong vaccine uptake that
followed the development and approval of the first polio vaccines in the mid1950s set in motion a series of public health initiatives that ultimately resulted
in a 99% reduction of the incidence of the disease worldwide. 32 By contrast,
there were signs early on in the COVID-19 pandemic that a significant
number of potential vaccine recipients were hesitant about receiving the
vaccines, or planned to skip COVID-19 vaccination altogether. 33 For
instance, less than three months after the World Health Organization declared
COVID-19 a pandemic, only around 50% of Americans indicated that they
were planning on receiving the vaccine, if one were to be made available
during the pandemic.34
The intertwined problems of vaccine trust and vaccine hesitancy at the
root of the resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases—or protracted
duration of outbreaks of new diseases—cannot be attributed to a single
factor.35 Some of these factors have deep historical and philosophical origins,
31
See Alex Kacik, Half of Americans are 'highly likely' to get COVID-19 Vaccinations,
MOD. HEALTH CARE (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/safety/halfamericans-are-highly-likely-get-covid-19-vaccinations (“Only around half of Americans are
highly likely to get vaccinated for COVID-19, according to a new survey. . . . That reflects
a sense of lack of safety around vaccines . . . .”); see also Lauran Neergaard & Hannah
Fingerhut, AP-NORC Poll: Only Half in US Want Shots as Vaccine Nears, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-norc-poll-us-half-want-vaccine-shots4d98dbfc0a64d60d52ac84c3065dac55 (“Many on the fence have safety concerns and want
to watch how the initial rollout [of the COVID-19 vaccine] fares.”).
32
WORLD HEALTH ORG., 10 Facts on Polio Eradication (Apr. 1, 2017),
https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/polio/en/.
33
Emily A. Harrison & Julia W. Wu, Vaccine Confidence in the Time of COVID-19, 22
EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1 (2020).
34
Warren Cornwall, Just 50% of Americans Plan to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine. Here’s
How to Win Over the Rest, SCIENCE (June 30, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2020/06/just-50-americans-plan-get-covid-19-vaccine-here-s-how-win-over-rest; see also
Alex Hartlage, Vaccine Hesitancy Post-Covid-19: Will Our Memory Fade or Last?,
VACCINES TODAY (July 1, 2020), https://www.vaccinestoday.eu/stories/vaccine-hesitancypost-covid-19-will-our-memory-fade-or-last/ (“[O]ver the last two decades, vaccine
hesitancy has risen so substantially that the WHO now considers it a major threat to global
health.”).
35
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Report of the SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy
11 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2014/october/
1_Report_WORKING_GROUP_vaccine_hesitancy_final.pdf (“[V]accine hesitancy is the
behaviour that results from the decision-making process and reflects a constellation of factors
that may influence the decision to accept some or all vaccines in accordance with the
recommended schedule.”); id. at 11-12 (describing two models for understanding vaccine
hesitancy, including one that focuses on complacency, confidence, and convenience); Daniel
A. Salmon et al, Vaccine Hesitancy: Causes, Consequences, and a Call to Action, 33
VACCINE D66, D66 (2015) (“There is a broad range of factors contributing to vaccine
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including heterogenous forms of resistance to government-endorsed
interventions, transversal distrust of health technologies that require the
insertion of extraneous substances into the human body, and general concerns
with how biomedical research has historically been conducted. 36 In other
cases, vaccine trust is compromised due to the emergence of more recent
problems, techniques and even political or social agendas. 37 The topic of
vaccine misinformation, particularly in the online context, falls under the
latter category. While not new, vaccine misinformation has been
exponentially exacerbated through use (and misuse) of the manifold avenues
for the dissemination of content opened up by the popularization of social
media. As seen in Part II, the online circulation of vaccine misinformation is
now a leading cause of the growth of vaccine mistrust and hesitancy.
Addressing the public health and technological paradox posed by insufficient
uptake of available vaccines thus entails considering how vaccine
misinformation propagates online; how this propagation has been
instrumentalized by actors with ideological or monetization purposes, or
both; and the policy and legal options available to curb the spread of vaccine
misinformation. This essay now begins that exploration, starting with the
historical and proximate roots of the growth of online vaccine
misinformation.
B. Charting the Rise of Vaccine Misinformation
Topics surrounding the development and administration of vaccines have
long been polarizing. For example, instances of popular opposition to
vaccination recommended by public health authorities have been documented
as early as in nineteenth-century England and America.38 The expansion of
hesitancy, including the compulsory nature of vaccines, their coincidental temporal
relationships to adverse health outcomes, unfamiliarity with vaccine-preventable diseases,
and lack of trust in corporations and public health agencies.”); E. David G. McIntosh et al.,
Vaccine Hesitancy and Refusal, 175 EUR. PEDIATRIC ASS’N 248, 248 (2016) (describing
vaccine hesitancy has a “multifactorial nature” that is driven primarily by opinions from the
antivaccine movement).
36
See, e.g., HIST. VACCINES, Cultural Perspectives on Vaccination (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/cultural-perspectives-vaccination
(“Public opinions about vaccination include varied and deep-seated beliefs, a result of the
tension between divergent cultural viewpoints and value systems. Several key cultural
perspectives on vaccination stem from (1) individual rights and public health stances toward
vaccination, (2) various religious standpoints and vaccine objections, and (3) suspicion and
mistrust of vaccines among different U.S. and global cultures and communities.”). See
generally HARRIET WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID (2006).
37
See infra, Part II.
38
See Martin Kaufman, The American Anti-Vaccinationists and Their Arguments, 41
BULL. HIST. MED. 463, 464-66 (1967) (“In the 1850s, opposition to vaccination arose, largely
from the irregular physicians, the advocates of unorthodox medical theories.”). See generally
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vaccination mandates in the 1960s and 1970s,39 while overwhelmingly
contributing to the reduction of the incidence of vaccine-preventable
diseases, was also used instrumentally to fuel doubts about vaccines and
vaccination policies in many areas across North America. 40 And, in what
remains perhaps the most well-known episode in the history of vaccine
misinformation, in 1998 a study published by then-doctor Andrew Wakefield
in The Lancet—one of the world’s leading peer-reviewed medical journals—
fraudulently implied the existence of a causal link between the MMR vaccine
(measles, mumps and rubella) and the development of autism in children.41
The study was immediately disputed by the medical and research
communities and eventually retracted in 2010, the same year in which the
General Medical Council in the United Kingdom declared that Wakefield had
acted “dishonestly and irresponsibly” and found him guilty of over thirty
charges of professional misconduct and banning him from practicing
medicine.42 Nevertheless, the discredited study remains influential among
communities questioning current approaches to vaccination and is often cited
outside the scientific world in connection with claims contesting the safety of
vaccines,43 or linking vaccination to conspiracy theories involving the pursuit
BERMAN, supra note 24.
39
In its seminal 1905 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of public health
authorities to mandate vaccination. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
40
MacDougall & Monnais, supra note 23, at E400 (“In Ontario, the Committee Against
Compulsory Vaccination and the Association for Vaccine Damaged Children emerged in
response to the [mandatory vaccination] legislation. . . . these groups claimed that doctors
and public health nurses misled parents about infant vaccination requirements and called for
parental choice.”).
41
See Fiona Godlee & Jane Smith, Wakefield’s Article Linking MMR Vaccine and
Autism Was Fraudulent, 342 BRIT. MED. J. 64, 64 (2011) (“Over the following decade [after
Wakefield’s article was published], epidemiological studies consistently found no evidence
of a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. By the time the paper was finally retracted
12 years later . . . few people could deny that it was fatally flawed both scientifically and
ethically.”).
42
See Clare Dyer, Wakefield Was Dishonest and Irresponsible over MMR Research,
Says GMC, 340 BRIT. MED. J. c593, c593 (2010) (“Andrew Wakefield . . . has been found
guilty of dishonesty and irresponsibility by the General Medical Council. The UK regulator
held that Dr Wakefield abused his position, subjected children to intrusive procedures such
as lumbar puncture and colonoscopy that were not clinically indicated, carried out research
which flouted the conditions of ethics committee approval and brought the medical
profession into disrepute.”); A Timeline of the Wakefield Retraction, 16 NAT. MED. 248, 248
(2010) (documenting the time from Wakefield’s initial publication to the retraction of said
publication).
43
See Clyde Haberman, A Discredited Vaccine Study’s Continuing Impact on Public
Health, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/us/a-discreditedvaccine-studys-continuing-impact-on-public-health.html (“Nonetheless, despite [Dr.
Wakefield] being held in disgrace, the vaccine-autism link has continued to be accepted on
faith by some.”).
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of hidden political or social agendas. 44
Although these examples are not exhaustive, they illustrate the
idiosyncratic landscape against which vaccine-specific misinformation has
historically proliferated. More recently, expressions of vaccine
misinformation have gained new life—and reached new audiences—through
online channels. For well over a decade, the internet has become one of the
prime venues for the dissemination of content about vaccines and
vaccination.45 Online channels are used to convey both accurate and
inaccurate information about vaccines. The same channels that carry
messages from the WHO or the U.S. Centers for Disease Controls and
Prevention can be—and are routinely—used by citizen-publishers posting or
reposting scientifically inaccurate vaccine-related information. 46 Even more
recently, they have also been used by individuals and automated programs
purposefully circulating vaccine content with the aim of sowing or increasing
discord—vaccine disinformation.47
Social media have become the prime venues for the circulation of both
misinformation and disinformation related to vaccines. As the second decade
44

See Matthew Hornsey et al., The Psychological Roots of Anti-Vaccination Attitudes:
A 24-Nation Investigation, 37 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 307, 308 (2018) (“For some, however,
individual conspiracy beliefs are not held in isolation, but rather emerge from a unitary
‘conspiracist’ world-view . . . . People who feel this is the way the world works . . . might be
motivated to believe conspiracies about science, with negative impacts on vaccination
intentions. Indeed, there is evidence from an online American sample that people’s
willingness to endorse conspiracies generally . . . are positively correlated with a range of
‘anti-science’ attitudes, including antivaccination attitudes.”).
45
See, e.g., Anna Kata, Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the postmodern paradigm-an overview of tactics and tropes used online by the anti-vaccination movement, 30
VACCINE 3778, 3778 (2012) (documenting this phenomenon with regard to anti-vaccine
activity); David A. Broniatowski et al., Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter Bots
and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1378, 1378 (2018)
(documenting this phenomenon in the context of the spread of automated vaccine-related
content in social media).
46
See, e.g., Cornelia Betsch et al., Opportunities and Challenges of Web 2.0 for
Vaccination Decisions, 30 VACCINE 3727, 3727 (2012) (“Websites that allow and promote
interaction among users are an increasingly popular source of health information. Users of
such so-called Web 2.0 applications (e.g. social media), while still in the minority, represent
a growing proportion of online communicators, including vocal and active anti-vaccination
groups as well as public health communicators.”); Kata, supra note 45, at 3779 (“Web 2.0
lets patients actively engage in their own care. While medical knowledge was previously
bound to textbooks and journals, the Internet allows access to the ‘school of lay medicine’,
shifting the locus of power from doctors as sole directors of a patient’s care to the patients
themselves.”).
47
Broniatowski et al., supra note 45, at 1288 (“Whereas bots that spread malware and
unsolicited content disseminated antivaccine messages, Russian trolls promoted discord.
Accounts masquerading as legitimate users create false equivalency, eroding public
consensus on vaccination.”).
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of the twenty-first century drew to a close, mainstream social media like
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube had become the largest venues
for the propagation of vaccine misinformation and disinformation. In 2018, a
pivotal study on online disinformation reported escalating levels of activity
specifically focused on the propagation of inaccurate vaccine-related content,
labeling these recent developments as a form of “weaponized” of health
communication.48
The increased circulation of inaccurate information about vaccines in
social media poses serious challenges to public health strategies designed to
curb the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. It presents heightened
hurdles when compared to previous embodiments of vaccine-specific
misinformation, as social media enable spreaders of misinformation to reach
wider audiences, as well as tapping into densely interconnected networks
focused on discussions surrounding highly divisive non-vaccine topics, such
as political and electoral themes, fake news and the role of mainstream media,
and conspiracy theories on a variety of topics. 49
Part II describes the specificities of vaccine misinformation within the
social media ecosystem. It is worth noting here that a growing body of
vaccine-focused research finds that the propagation of inaccurate vaccine
content through social media is creating significant problems for the
implementation of vaccination campaigns and contributing to the erosion of
overall levels of trust in vaccines.50

II. VACCINE MISINFORMATION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
We now turn to the specific role played by social media in the propagation
of vaccine-related messages. Part A describes how social media platforms
can function as conveyers of both accurate and inaccurate information about
vaccines. Part B then focuses on mechanisms used to disproportionally
amplify anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning content shared through
mainstream social media.
48

Id.
See Betsch, supra note 46, at 3728 (“Web 2.0 [is defined] as Internet applications that
enable users to create and upload new content, comment on existing content, and share
content with other users. . . . Social media, for example, provide opportunities to publicly
express support for an issue and forward information to friends without great effort.”); Kata,
supra note 45, at 3779 (noting a similar definition).
50
See, e.g., Broniatowski et al., supra note 30, at S312 (“Tightly knit communities that
collectively refuse to vaccinate lack herd immunity . . . and damage herd immunity for the
broader population. In 2019, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported
outbreaks of measles in several US states and worldwide, all of which struck communities
with low vaccination rates . . . . Finally, some have raised concerns that the COVID-19
‘infodemic’ could trigger vaccine refusal.”).
49
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A. The Dual Role of Social Media in Vaccine-related Communications
Social media rose to prominence during the transition from the 2000s to
the 2010s. The Pew Research Center started collecting data on social media
usage in 2005.51 At that point, only 5% of adults in the United States used at
least one of the then-largest social media platforms.52 In 2011, half of all
Americans were using at least one of these platforms, and by 2019 that
number was approaching three quarters of the U.S. population. 53 Among
Americans aged between 18 and 29 years old, 90% used at least one
mainstream social media—which for purposes of the Pew Research Center
study comprised, as of 2019, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter,
Pinterest, Snapchat, YouTube, WhatsApp and Reddit. 54 The study further
showed that usage of mainstream social media was fairly evenly distributed
when race, gender and income are considered.55 However, usage of a
particular social media varied significantly within these and additional
parameters, including formal levels of education.56
The expansion of social media throughout the late 2000s and the 2010s
has had an impact on health-related communications in the online
environment. The use of social media has been shown to help the
dissemination of public health research, inform policy debates and create
venues for the formation of professional, patient, and activist communities.57
In the case of vaccine-related communications, social media have been
shown to play a dual role, functioning as fora and conduits for content
promoting both accurate and inaccurate information about vaccines. On the
one hand, they have become an important vehicle for efforts from public
health-oriented institutions seeking to disseminate accurate vaccine
information as part of educational campaigns, as well as campaigns designed
to curb vaccine hesitancy.58 On the other, recent studies have shown that
51

PEW RES. CTR., Social Media Fact Sheet (Jun. 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See Jessica Y. Breland, et al., Social Media as a Tool to Increase the Impact of Public
Health Research, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1890, 1891 (2017) (“Social media provides a way
to share evidence for or against health policies with the public, policymakers, and other key
stakeholders. . . . Social media can be used for numerous research purposes, including
surveillance activities and behavioral interventions. . . . The increasing presence of
academics, clinicians, industry professionals, public health departments, and health care
systems on social media provides many opportunities for professional connection outside
traditional settings.”).
58
See Mark Dredze et al., Understanding Vaccine Refusal: Why We Need Social Media
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social media function as amplifiers of both misinformation and
disinformation on vaccine-related topics. 59
This amplification results in a minority of social media users holding
views that are not supported by the scientific status quo, yielding a
disproportionate amount of influence in the online environment by spreading
anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning content more efficiently—through
highly connected networks—than individuals or institutions spreading
accurate information about vaccines. 60 This phenomenon is particularly
salient in the case of parents of young children—the latter being typically
indicated to receive more vaccines than adult populations, thus making
parents preferred targets of misinformation in this area. Researchers have
long established that an overwhelming majority of parents hold favorable
views on vaccination. A study conducted in 2018 in the United Kingdom
found that 91% of parents regarded vaccines as “important.”61 At the same
time, the study found that 41% of parents using social media reported
encountering “negative messages” about vaccines or vaccination on a
relatively regular basis.62 Among parents of very young children—defined as
under five years old—that percentage climbed to 50%.63
Disproportionate amplification of vaccine misinformation also exposed
users who are not invested in parental vaccination debates to inaccurate
content about vaccines. In a 2019 experiment, for example, a group of
journalists analyzed the results of nearly 100 million individuals expressing
vaccination views on Facebook.64 The majority of views individuals
expressed were either undecided on the question of vaccine efficacy or
against vaccination.65As discussed in Part III.B.2, data related to vaccine
misinformation practices drawn from social media sites is especially
relevant—for example, as much as half the tweets about vaccination on

Now, 50 AM. J. PREV. MED. 550, 551 (2016) (“The messages observed and shared [on social
media] can provide a real-time, detailed picture of public attitudes toward
vaccination . . . because the Internet allows such rapid spread of anti-vaccine arguments, it
is essential to harness the strength of the Internet to combat them.”).
59
Betsch, supra note 46; Kata, supra note 45.
60
See Neil F. Johnson et al., The Online Competition Between Pro- and AntiVaccination Views, 582 NATURE 230, 230 (2020) (“Although smaller in overall size, antivaccination clusters manage to become highly entangled with undecided clusters in the main
online network, whereas pro-vaccination clusters are more peripheral.”).
61
ROYAL SOC’Y PUB. HEALTH, MOVING THE NEEDLE: PROMOTING VACCINATION
UPTAKE ACROSS THE LIFE COURSE 3 (2019), https://www.rsph.org.uk/static/uploaded/
3b82db00-a7ef-494c-85451e78ce18a779.pdf.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Johnson, supra note 60, at 230.
65
Id. at 230-31.
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Twitter are associated with anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning beliefs. 66
In recent years, the spread of vaccine-related content in social media has
also found new avenues through the use of automated programs that can
spread pro- and anti-vaccine, vaccine-questioning content, or both at the same
time, as I explain in the following section.
B. The Automatization and Weaponization of Vaccine Misinformation
Through Social Media
The use of software to disseminate online content is very common, within
and outside social media. Studies indicate that towards the later stages of the
2010s, automatically generated content became pervasive across the internet.
The title of a piece published in The Atlantic in 2017—The Internet Is Mostly
Bots—aptly captured the emerging online landscape.67
A study surveying online activity throughout 2018 calculated that around
40% of online traffic was likely automated.68 Another study calculated that
programs spreading malicious content69 accounted for 20.4% of automated
traffic.70 Although this constituted a 6.4% drop in traffic linked to malicious
software when compared to the findings of a similar study looking at data
from 2017, the levels of sophistication of these programs remained
consistently high.71
The use of automated software combined with increasingly sophisticated
techniques has enabled the propagation of vaccine-related content on
increasingly larger scales. In 2015, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) conducted a four-week challenge—dubbed the
Twitter Bot Detection Challenge—during which participants analyzed
vaccine-related tweets and attempted to identify which ones were associated
with certain types of activity.72 In particular, the challenge focused on
66

Broniatowski, supra note 45, at 1378.
Adrienne Lafrance, The Internet Is Mostly Bots, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/bots-bots-bots/515043/.
68
Matthew Hughes, Bots drove nearly 40% of internet traffic last year — and the
naughty ones are getting smarter, TNW (Apr. 18, 2019, 1:00 PM UTC),
https://thenextweb.com/security/2019/04/17/bots-drove-nearly-40-of-internet-traffic-lastyear-and-the-naughty-ones-are-getting-smarter/.
69
The study defined malicious content as content spread by “bad bots.” GLOBAL DOTS,
2019 BAD BOT REPORT: THE BOT ARMS RACE CONTINUES 10 (2019),
https://www.globaldots.com/resources/blog/industry-report-bad-bot-landscape-2019-thebot-arms-race-continues/. These bots are automated programs that “scrape data from sites
without permission in order to reuse it (e.g., pricing, inventory levels) and gain a competitive
edge.” Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
V.S. Subrahmanian et al., The DARPA Twitter Bot Challenge, COMPUTER, June 13,
67
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“influence bots,” which are “realistic, automated identities that illicitly shape
discussions on social media sites like Twitter and Facebook, posing a risk to
freedom of expression.”73 While the study was largely procedurally
oriented—seeking to examine strategies to detect, analyze, and categorize
bots—it called attention to the growing sophistication of content automation
strategies.74
A seminal study published in 2018 analyzed the dissemination of vaccinespecific content through Twitter between July 2014 and September 2017.75
The study contrasted automated programs (bots and content pollutants) with
programs operated by humans but engaging in malicious behaviors (trolls).76
In line with definitions of “bot” in both the technical and popular literatures,
the study looked at bots as “accounts that automate content promotion” in the
field of vaccines.77 Content polluters were defined as “malicious accounts
identified as promoting commercial content and malware” related to
vaccines.78 And trolls were characterized as accounts operating in the vaccine
space and “exhibiting malicious behaviors yet operated by humans.” 79
The study found that accounts associated with sophisticated automated
programs tweeted vaccine-related content at significantly higher rates than
non-automated accounts.80 Sophisticated programs are more complex and
better at avoiding detection than average programs.81 The study also found
that “content polluters” propagated the highest amount of anti-vaccine
content, at a rate of 75% more than non-automated accounts. 82
One of the most salient findings of the study had to do with vaccine
content disseminated through accounts located in areas of the world
associated with the online promotion of misinformation and disinformation
2016, at 38, 39.
73
Id. at 38. Other categories of bots categorized in the study but not the goal of the
challenge were spambots, which spread content qualifying as spam, and paybots, which use
different types of strategies to illicitly generate revenue for the account associated with that
bot. Id.
74
Id. at 44; see also Emerging Technology from the arXiv, How DARPA Took On the
Twitter Bot Menace with One Hand Behind Its Back, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/01/28/163553/how-darpa-took-on-the-twitterbot-menace-with-one-hand-behind-its-back/ (“The battle between bots and bot-hunters is
one that is constantly evolving. With papers like this, the bot-hunters are revealing their hand
in a way that allows bot-makers to design strategies to specifically defeat these
algorithms. . . . Either way, this cat-and-mouse battle is set to continue.”).
75
Broniatowski, supra note 45, at 1378.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1381.
79
Id. at 1382.
80
Id. at 1380.
81
Id. at 1382.
82
Id.
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in other, more visible areas—namely Russia and the post-Soviet republics,
which have been linked with political misinformation and disinformation.
Trolls traced backed to Russia were particularly active in spreading
vaccine misinformation and disinformation.83 They employed a two-pronged
strategy, spreading both pro- and anti-vaccine content.84 They did this as part
of a broader strategy to tap into divisive topics among in the United States
and increase discord.85 Sophisticated Twitter bots traced to other locations
also engaged in this type of activity.86
An additional strategy employed by both bots and trolls included
“flooding the discourse,” a technique that consists in increasing the
circulation of content centered on a specific topic—in this case, through
tweets about vaccines or vaccination—with the purpose of capturing social
media traffic.87 A related strategy consisted in the use of “astroturfing,” 88 a
technique through which the origin of a message is made to appear as
originating from grassroots organizations supporting a particular view. 89 In
the case of vaccines, astroturfing on Twitter was linked to the propagation of
anti-vaccine content, seemingly with the purpose of conveying the
impression of the existence of grassroots debates about the efficacy of
vaccines.90 The study posited that trolls and semi-automated accounts
(human-operated accounts occasionally also associated with bot activity)
employed this strategy especially often, but recognized some limitations on
and called for further study of the use of this particular technique in
connection with Twitter vaccine discourse.91
The use of automated programs to spread vaccine-specific content has
recently become intertwined with larger and more structured efforts to spread
disinformation on multiple themes for geopolitical reasons. These efforts,
emanating predominantly from Russia and certain post-Soviet actors, are
meant to increase discord among Western communities by tapping into topics
known to be polarizing.92 These efforts further seek to undermine the
83

Id. at 1382.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1380; see also Jeanette Sutton, Health Communication Trolls and Bots Versus
Public Health Agencies’ Trusted Voices, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1281, 1281 (2018)
(contextualizing flooding techniques to propagate vaccine content through social media).
88
Broniatowski, supra note 45, at 1382.
89
Id. at 1382-84.
90
Id. at 1382.
91
Id. at 1382, 1384.
92
See, e.g., Jessica Glenza, Coronavirus: US says Russia behind disinformation
campaign, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/22/
coronavirus-russia-disinformation-campaign-us-officials (“‘Russia’s intent is to sow discord
and undermine US institutions and alliances from within, including through covert and
84
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credibility of public-sector institutions in the Western world, with a particular
focus on the United States.93 These strategies were employed even before
COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, with social media accounts traced back
to Russia disseminating disinformation across multiple health-related areas
in the context of COVID-19 debates. 94

III. ONGOING SOCIAL MEDIA RESPONSES TO VACCINE
MISINFORMATION
As more information on the specifics of vaccine misinformation has
become available, social media have gradually taken steps to curb its spread.
From 2019 onwards, mainstream social media have adopted a variety of
approaches to deal with inaccurate vaccine-specific content made available
by their users. As seen below, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020
contributed to the adoption of seemingly increasingly stringent approaches to
the moderation of vaccine-related content, described in Part A. However, as
detailed in Part B, ongoing modes of self-regulation are highly heterogenous
and present several practical problems.
A. A Taxonomy of Mainstream Social Media Responses
1. Suppression or “Zero Tolerance” Approaches
Suppression approaches, also known as “zero tolerance” policies, consist
in the removal of content qualifying as inaccurate information. In the context
of vaccine misinformation propagated through mainstream social media, this
approach was pioneered by Pinterest. In February 2019, the company
announced that it would block all vaccine-related search results. 95 The
coercive malign influence campaigns,’ said Philip Reeker, the acting assistant secretary of
state for Europe and Eurasia.”). Iran has also been linked to the exploitation of health-related
disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Ali Breland, Russia Isn’t the Only
Country Pushing Coronavirus Disinformation, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/03/russia-iran-coronavirus-bioweapon/
(“Iranian media organizations linked to the government have also been taking advantage of
fears over the virus to spread other conspiracies. . . . Iranians are pushing coronavirus
conspiracies even more strongly than Russia.”).
93
Glenza, supra note 92.
94
Id.
95
See, e.g., Taylor Telford, Pinterest is blocking search results about vaccines to protect
users from misinformation, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2029), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2019/02/21/pinterest-is-blocking-all-vaccine-related-searches-all-or-nothingapproach-policing-health-misinformation/ (“As social media companies wrestle with how to
police dangerous health misinformation on their platforms, Pinterest has taken an extreme
approach: blocking search results related to vaccinations, whether the results are medically
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decision was prompted by data revealing that most Pinterest searches about
vaccines yielded results containing information that contradicted current
scientific standards.96
In the case of Pinterest, this approach still allowed for users to pin
vaccine-related content to their personal board, but that content is not made
available through the search function, remaining confined to personal
pages.97
Importantly, this was designed as a temporary measure. 98 Eventually
Pinterest paired this approach with interventive steps, consisting of the
display of vaccine content originating from legitimate sources—including the
World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
and the American Academy of Pediatrics.99
Also in early 2019, Pinterest blocked accounts linked to groups or
individuals propagating vaccine misinformation and disinformation. 100 This
approach resulted in the blocking of content promoted on Pinterest by the
National Vaccine Information Center, an organization originally named
Dissatisfied Parents Together and had no connection to federal agencies or
public health authorities, which was launched in the 1980s and has since
become one of the leading promoters of vaccine misinformation in the United
States.101 Pinterest also blocked Larry Cook, a prominent figure in the antivaccine movement, particularly known for his use of social media channels
to spread vaccine misinformation.102
As seen below, while Pinterest took a zero-tolerance approach to the
moderation of vaccine content even before the COVID-19 pandemic, other
social media took less restrictive approaches. This allowed anti-vaccine
discourses to continue circulating within large swaths of the mainstream
social media space and, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the reach
of anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning content increased substantially. Larry
accurate or not.”).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Erin Brodwin, How Pinterest beat back vaccine misinformation — and what
Facebook could learn from its approach, STAT (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/09/21/pinterest-facebook-vaccine-misinformation/. For an illustration of how Pinterest
shares only vaccine content produced by reputable institutions in the public health space, see
Pinterest, Immunization (last accessed Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.pinterest.com/thephf/
immunization/ (listing vaccine-related “pins” from institutions including the World Health
Organization and UNICEF ).
100
Julia Carrie Wong, Anti-vaxx propaganda has gone viral on Facebook. Pinterest has
a cure, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/20/
pinterest-anti-vaxx-propaganda-search-facebook.
101
Id.
102
Id.
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Cook, for instance, maintained a Facebook group with close to 200,000
members until Facebook deleted it in late 2020. 103
The increased circulation of vaccine misinformation during the COVID19 pandemic, which this Essay describes in greater detail in Part III.B.2,
eventually prompted several mainstream social media to adopt suppression
measures. In mid-October 2020, YouTube implemented a policy of removal
of videos sharing vaccine misinformation.104
2. Limiting and Downgrading Approaches
A different type of moderating approach consists of allowing anti-vaccine
or vaccine-questioning discourses to circulate within a given social media (or
group of related social media), but use techniques that will make this type of
content less prominent to users.
Shortly after Pinterest implemented its initial suppression approach,
Facebook announced that it would continue to allow anti-vaccine content to
be shared—both on Facebook and on Facebook-owned Instagram—but that
it would limit its reach by not allowing anti-vaccine content to be promoted
through recommendations and ads.105 Additionally, the company announced
that it would downgrade vaccine misinformation showing up as search
results.106
As is the case with suppression approaches, limiting and downgrading
approaches can also be paired with other interventions, such as the display of
credible information on vaccines originating from reputable institutions.
3. Educational Approaches
Educational approaches consist of the active promotion of accurate
content about vaccines and vaccination, typically sourced from credible
scientific or public health-oriented organizations. For example, a search
103
Aatif Sulleyman, Facebook Bans One of the Anti-Vaccine Movement's Biggest
Groups for Violating QAnon Rules, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 18, 2020, 12:36 PM EST),
https://www.newsweek.com/facebook-bans-anti-vaccine-group-violating-qanon-rules154840.
104
See Robert Hart, YouTube Bans Covid-19 Vaccine Misinformation, FORBES (Oct. 14,
2020, 12:10 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2020/10/14/youtube-banscovid-19-vaccine-misinformation/?sh=8e0f4d868a9b (“YouTube is cracking down on
content peddling Covid-19 vaccine falsehoods, including banning anything that suggests a
vaccine would kill people, cause infertility or be used to implant microchips into people
getting vaccinated. The video platform has pledged to delete videos containing misleading
claims about Covid-19 vaccines, it said in a blog post.”).
105
Louise Matsakis, Facebook Will Crack Down on Anti-Vaccine Content, WIRED (Mar.
7, 2019, 5:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-anti-vaccine-crack-down/.
106
Id.
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performed on Facebook for the word “vaccine” in early February 2021
directed the user to content from prominent organizations in the following
order: first, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control; second, the American
Academy of Pediatrics; third, the American Cancer Society; fourth, the
World Health Organization; and fifth, UNICEF. 107 A similar search
performed on Twitter led to the appearance of a large informational panel
noting that “[t]o make sure you get the best information on vaccinations,
resources are available from the US Department of Health & Human
Services,” and providing a link for, and the Twitter handle of, vaccines.gov,
a website maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services. 108
Educational approaches were adopted broadly during the COVID-19
pandemic by players in the online environment, both within and outside
social media. For instance, in December 2020, as the first COVID-19
vaccines were being authorized across the world, Google began displaying
informational panels about each type of COVID-19 vaccine as part of search
results related to vaccines.109 This replicated a strategy previously employed
by Google to counter general misinformation about the pandemic by showing
informational panels with content provided by credible organizations on the
SARS-CoV-2 virus and its spread, public health measures taken and
recommended by public health authorities, as well as the location of COVID19 testing centers.110
B. Shortcomings of Current Self-Regulatory Approaches
Overall, the steps taken by mainstream social media in response to the
growing problem of vaccine misinformation have increased the amount and
visibility of accurate information about vaccines in the online environment.
Yet, as the example of moderation of vaccine content by Facebook presented
in this section shows, social media responses have largely left the sources of
107

The search was performed in English and from the United States.
The search was similarly performed in English and from the United States. See U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Vaccine Safety (last accessed May 31, 2021),
https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/safety (describing vaccine safety and providing answers to
common questions about vaccine side effects).
109
See, e.g., Jon Porter, Google search panels launch to counter vaccine misinformation,
THE VERGE (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/10/22167185/googlevaccine-information-search-results-youtube-information-panels (“Google is launching new
vaccine information panels in its search results to counter misinformation and educate people
about what’s available in their location, the company announced today. . . . The panels
include information on each individual vaccine, and aim to address vaccine misinformation,
and give guidance about how, when, and where people can receive the shots. Google has
used similar information panels to share information about COVID-19 generally, as well as
the locations of testing centers.”).
110
Id.
108
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vaccine-specific misinformation untouched. Part III.B first articulates the
general shortcomings of current modes of self-regulation and then presents a
case study that illustrates the shortcomings in the response to vaccine
misinformation adopted by the social media that is home to the largest
amount of vaccine misinformation, Facebook.
1. Shortcomings of Social Media Self-Regulation
Social media sites have adopted policies to combat vaccine
misinformation that are, on balance, somewhat similar. The dominant
approach, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been to favor
educational strategies, in some cases coupled with downgrading or other
limiting policies.111 Attempts to remove postings containing information
flagged as vaccine misinformation have been rarer, with Pinterest’s
suppression approach applying to vaccine content in general remaining
exceptional.112
The availability of accurate information about vaccines on social media
is insufficient to counter the growing detrimental effects of online vaccine
misinformation.113 Dissemination of accurate information alone does not
guarantee that the content will be consumed or critically assimilated, and its
impact on effecting behavioral changes in social media users pre-disposed to
consume vaccine misinformation has been minimal. 114
Large actors promoting accurate vaccine information through social
media predominantly resort to vaccine literacy campaigns, which consist of
sharing information from credible sources in response to searches for
vaccine- or vaccination-related topics. However, as illustrated below in the
case of Facebook, studies have suggested that these campaigns have a modest
impact and are likely ineffectual in countering the disproportionate escalation
of anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning discourses in social media. 115
Pages or accounts on mainstream social media promoting pro-vaccine
views tend to have significantly larger followings than anti-vaccine or
111

See e.g., Maryke S. Steffens et al., Using Social Media for Vaccination Promotion:
Practices and Challenges, 6 DIGITAL HEALTH 1, 7 (2020) (surveying social media responses
to vaccine misinformation).
112
Id.
113
See Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb, Toward Interactive, Internet-Based Decision Aid
for Vaccination Decisions: Better Information Alone is Not Enough, 30 VACCINE 3813, 3813
(2012) (“[I]nformation alone is not sufficient. Even with access to complete and wellvalidated information about vaccine- and disease-related outcomes and probabilities, the
decision maker needs a procedure or mechanism to translate the information into an action
recommendation—that is, a way to use the information effectively to make a decision.”).
114
Id. at 3813, 3816-17.
115
See infra Part III.B.2.
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vaccine-questioning pages and accounts.116 For instance, the Facebook page
for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had around two
million followers in early 2020. At the same time, a large Facebook page
promoting anti-vaccine views would draw around 40,000 followers. 117 Yet,
anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning pages or accounts tend to be dedicated to
either just vaccine content or a narrow segment of health-related subjects. By
contrast, pages or accounts associated with the CDC or the WHO are much
more general purpose. As seen below, pages and accounts spreading negative
views about vaccines were much more efficacious at spreading their content
and reaching other users than pages conveying general-purpose, albeit provaccine, information.118
Additionally, there is a significant asymmetry between the production of
accurate and inaccurate vaccine-related content, particularly when the former
is conceived as part of a set of educational materials.119 Content qualifying as
misinformation or disinformation can be generated fairly quickly and
inexpensively, as it does not rely on the collection, treatment and analysis of
supporting data, such as studies or surveys. The creation of countervailing
educational content, on the other hand, typically requires more resources,
coordination of multiple data entry points and the time lag associated with
obtaining those data and treating them for educational purposes. This can be
especially pronounced in the case of emerging diseases like COVID-19,
about which relatively little is known at first within the scientific community,
whereas actors in the misinformation and disinformation arenas can quickly
repackage existing content (e.g.,., unsubstantiated claims about measles
vaccines producing a specific detrimental effect) and link it to quickly
expanding debates in social media about new pathogens or public health
problems (e.g.,., by making unsubstantiated claims about COVID-19
vaccines producing the same detrimental effect(s) claimed previously in
connection with measles vaccines).120
Another problem with vaccine literacy campaigns promoted by social
media is that they are currently structured against the backdrop of the
heterogenous and largely permissive approaches to vaccine content
moderation. The adoption of less stringent modes of responses to the growth
of social media-based vaccine misinformation creates a porous ecosystem in
which this type of content can continue to circulate with relative ease. This
116

Jonhson, supra note 60, at 230.
Id.
118
Id. at 231.
119
See e.g., Renée DiResta, Virus Experts Aren’t Getting the Message Out, ATLANTIC
(May 6, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/health-experts-dontunderstand-how-information-moves/611218/ (“If the authorities can’t satisfy the public’s
desire to know more, others will fill the void with misinformation.”).
120
Id.
117
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porosity, allied with the time lag in responses between different social media,
allows for the migration of inaccurate vaccine content. Consider the case of
Larry Cook, one of the leading figures in the online anti-vaccination
movement. Mr. Cook has long been known for orchestrating social media
campaigns urging followers to both question the safety of vaccines and
refrain from receiving recommended vaccines. 121 Pinterest blocked Mr. Cook
in February 2019.122 In response, he focused his activity on much larger
platforms, Facebook and Twitter.123 It was not until mid-November 2020,
when Mr. Cook’s role in spreading QAnon conspiracy theories (in addition
to vaccine misinformation) became the subject of more publicized
discussions, that these two platforms also blocked Mr. Cook. 124 This example
highlights some of the costs of reliance on heterogenous modes of selfregulation in a borderless environment—namely how the lack of concerted
efforts leaves significant swaths of online territory uncovered by the response
of a single player; and the related time-gap problem, which in the example
surveyed here covered both the months leading to the COVID-19 pandemic,
as well as the entire period of the pandemic during which the first vaccines
were being developed, tested and assessed by regulatory authorities in the
United States and abroad.
Additionally, some social media platforms might not be motivated to
respond to vaccine misinformation for a variety of reasons, including the fact
that the dissemination of vaccine misinformation has become increasingly
linked with possibilities of content monetization, as noted above. The case
study on Facebook presented in the following section further illustrates how
social media platforms themselves—and not just originators of
misinformation—often make money if vaccine misinformation is consumed
by large groups of users.125
Finally, in addition to problems inherent to lack of uniformity, stringency,
and motivation to intervene, current social media responses are also
121
See Sulleyman, supra note 103 (“Larry Cook, a prominent figure in anti-vaccine
circles and the creator of the ‘Stop Mandatory Vaccination’ group on Facebook, has had his
Facebook and Twitter accounts suspended. . . . In February, it emerged that the mother of a
four-year-old boy who died of flu had opted not to use the Tamiflu medication that had been
prescribed by a doctor, and was discussing natural ‘remedies’ with members of the Stop
Mandatory Vaccination group instead.”); Wong, supra note 100 (“The policy change cleared
the way for Pinterest to deploy a number of technological approaches to combating anti-vaxx
propaganda. The company has banned boards by a number of prominent anti-vaccine
propagandists, including the National Vaccine Information Center and Larry Cook, who runs
the website and Facebook group ‘StopMandatory Vaccination.’”).
122
Wong, supra note 100.
123
Id.; Sulleyman, supra note 103.
124
Wong, supra note 100.
125
See infra Part III.B.2.
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hampered by technical limitations.126 These limitations further accentuate
concerns that overall approaches to the spread of vaccine misinformation
across social media platforms may be lacking. Examples of these limitations
are manifold. For instance, Facebook uses a machine-learning algorithm to
detect both “hate speech and disinformation.”127 Most content flagged by the
algorithm as falling under either of these categories is then screened by a
human, although in cases in which the algorithm determines that there is a
high probability that the content amounts to hate speech or misinformation,
the program removes it automatically.128 The algorithm is very good at
performing its screening function in areas where it has been trained on data
for extended periods. By late 2019 it was able to detect 88.8% of all hate
speech on Facebook, for example.129 However, the emergence of events—
and by extension, data—materially different from the ones on which the
algorithm has been trained drastically reduces the accuracy and speed of
automated screening. The time it takes to train the algorithm on emerging
data needed to contextualize the screening process renders it much less
effective for addressing large-scale events with a quick onset accompanied
by an exponential increase in the proliferation of new forms of problematic
content. This was the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which
Facebook had to rely primarily on human-based screening of content
potentially qualifying as COVID-related misinformation. 130
A study published in October 2020, as the first COVID-19 vaccines were
poised to receive emergency authorization in the United States and Europe,
showed that YouTube’s newly adopted policy of removing videos
propagating COVID-19 misinformation routinely failed to capture a
significant amount of anti-vaccine videos in Portuguese that were being
shared on YouTube.131 Portuguese is the seventh most-spoken language in
126

See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
Karen Hao, Facebookʼs AI is still largely baffled by covid misinformation, MIT TECH.
REV. (May 12, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/12/1001633/ai-is-stilllargely-baffled-by-covid-misinformation/.
128
Id.; see also Guy Rosen, Community Standards Enforcement Report, November 2019
Edition, FACEBOOK (Nov. 13, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/11/communitystandards-enforcement-report-nov-2019/ (“[W]e’ve used these [AI] systems to proactively
detect potential hate speech violations and send them to our content review teams since
people can better assess context where AI cannot.”).
129
Hao, supra note 127.
130
Id.; see also Roshan Sumbaly et al., Using AI to detect COVID-19 misinformation
and exploitative content, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), https://ai.facebook.com/blog/using-aito-detect-covid-19-misinformation-and-exploitative-content (“Since the pandemic began,
we’ve used our current AI systems and deployed new ones to take COVID-19-related
material our fact-checking partners have flagged as misinformation and then detect copies
when someone tries to share them.”).
131
See Dayane Fumiyo Tokojima Machado et al., Natural Stings: Selling Distrust About
127
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the world, with around 220 million native speakers.132
All these shortcomings combine to form a social media ecosystem in
which vaccine misinformation continues to travel with relative ease, even as
more social media platforms revise their vaccine-specific misinformation
policies—many of them driven by pressure stemming from the growth of
misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. The Growth of Vaccine Misinformation on Social Media During the
COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of Facebook
The propagation of misinformation about health-related topics grew
significantly in recent years and gained new momentum with the COVID-19
pandemic, especially in the online environment. 133 As the race to develop
COVID-19 vaccines became central to national and global responses to the
pandemic, misinformation focused specifically on vaccines and vaccination
proliferated especially quickly.134
A study published by the Center to Counter Digital Hate in July 2020
examined over four hundred accounts associated with the largest social media
platforms – Facebook, Facebook-owned Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter –
looking for increases in the following of anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning
content.135 Among the accounts surveyed, the largest 197 (measured by
number of followers) had added over 8 million followers since 2019. 136 While
Vaccines on Brazilian YouTube, FRONTIERS COMM. (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2020.577941/full (“Despite YouTube’s
statements, M&D about vaccines continue to be disseminated in videos in Portuguese,
reaching a large audience. We found 52 videos containing M&D about vaccines.”); see also
Fernanda Ferreira, Antivaccine videos slip through YouTube’s advertising policies, new
study finds, SCIENCE (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/11/
antivaccine-videos-slip-through-youtube-s-advertising-policies-new-study-finds (“[A] new
study in Brazil suggests YouTube’s moderation policies miss many anti-vaccination videos
in Portuguese.”).
132
James Lane, The 10 Most Spoken Languages in the World, BABEL (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.babbel.com/en/magazine/the-10-most-spoken-languages-in-the-world.
133
Editorial Board, Coronavirus Misinformation Needs Engagement, 581 NATURE 355,
355 (2020).
134
See, e.g., Jason Murdock, Anti-Vax Posts Against Future COVID-19 Vaccine Steadily
Increasing on Social Media, Researchers Warn, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.newsweek.com/coronavirus-antivax-misinformation-rising-social-mediapinterest-research-1525073 (“Misinformation about a vaccine linked to the ongoing COVID19 pandemic is ‘steadily rising’ on social media, experts say. . . . One of the things we are
seeing on social media now is a steady increase of anti-future COVID-19 vaccine posts.”).
135
CTR. COUNTERING DIGITAL HATE, The Anti-Vaxx Industry: How Big Tech Powers
and Profits from Vaccine Misinformation, July 2020, at 5 [hereinafter The Anti-Vaxx
Industry], https://252f2edd-1c8b-49f5-9bb2-cb57bb47e4ba.filesusr.com/ugd/
f4d9b9_6910f8ab94a241cfa088953dd5e60968.pdf.
136
Id.

52

JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION

[Vol. 4:1

the period surveyed in the study partly pre-dates the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, it illustrates a trend that continued to unfold in later months of the
pandemic.137
Another 2020 study, published in Nature, provided data on the dynamics
of vaccine misinformation disseminated through Facebook. 138 The takeaways
from this study are especially valuable because Facebook, at over 2.6 billion
users,139 is both the most widely used social media platform and the largest
social media venue for the propagation of vaccine misinformation. 140
The Nature study looked for Facebook users who had shared views about
vaccines, irrespective of their leanings on the topic. It identified 100 million
relevant accounts for which there was evidence that vaccine content was
being sharing or consumed.141 Users active in the vaccine space on Facebook
were located in multiple countries and operated in a variety of languages. 142
Despite the ideological differences between users sharing or consuming proand anti-vaccine content, the study showed that Facebook users with an
interest in vaccine content were becoming increasingly more connected. 143
137
See, e.g., Alexandra S. Levine, Misinformation About the vaccine could be worse
than
disinformation
about
the
elections,
POLITICO
(Dec.
21,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/21/social-media-vaccine-misinformation-449770
(“Health experts have been warning about the need to prepare for vaccine misinformation
since the early days of the pandemic.”); Lois Beckett, Misinformation 'superspreaders':
Covid vaccine falsehoods still thriving on Facebook and Instagram, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6,
2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/06/facebook-instagram-urged-fightdeluge-anti-covid-vaccine-falsehoods (“Researchers say big Facebook accounts still
condemn vaccines while anti-vaxxers banned from Facebook have fled to
Instagram. . . . Conspiracy theories and misinformation about the coronavirus vaccine are
still spreading on Facebook and Instagram, more than a month after Facebook pledged it
would take them down.”); Shannon Bond, ‘The Perfect Storm’: How Vaccine
Misinformation Spread To The Mainstream, NPR (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
2020/12/10/944408988/the-perfect-storm-how-coronavirus-spread-vaccinemisinformation-to-the-mainstream (noting the unabated circulation of vaccine
misinformation in late 2020 and early 2021).
138
Johnson, supra note 60, at 230.
139
Facebook had over 2.6 billion users at the time of the Nature study. Andrew
Hutchinson, Facebook Closes in on New Milestone of 3 Billion Total Users Across its
Platforms, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/
facebook-closes-in-on-new-milestone-of-3-billion-total-users-across-its-pla/577048/.
By
the end of 2020, that number had increased to 2.8 billion. STATISTA, Number of monthly
active Facebook users worldwide as of 4th quarter 2020 (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-usersworldwide/.
140
See The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 135 (“It is also clear that the anti-vaxx
movement is most popular on Facebook.”).
141
Johnson, supra note 60, at 230.
142
Id.
143
Id.
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Mimicking what happens outside the context of social media, the majority
of Facebook users active in the sharing or consumption of vaccine content
have favorable views about vaccines. 144 Nonetheless, users questioning
vaccines and sharing or consuming anti-vaccine content formed more
clusters. A cluster was defined as a Facebook page and associated followers.
The study found that vaccine-questioning and anti-vaccine clusters were
twice as numerous as pro-vaccine clusters.
The same study also revealed that anti-vaccine clusters on Facebook were
much better at reaching Facebook users with seemingly undecided views on
vaccines or vaccination than pro-vaccine ones. 145 The study also showed that
undecided users, estimated to amount to 50 million, are now considerably
more active than what was previously known, conducting searches for
vaccine related-content and engaging with anti-vaccine or vaccinequestioning clusters.146 Strategies used by clusters disseminating anti-vaccine
or vaccine-questioning content had become “robust and resilient,” thus
significantly limiting the persuasive effect of techniques employed by provaccine Facebook clusters—which consisted primarily of sharing vaccine
information from credible institutions and sources. 147
During the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook added
850,000 users following anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning pages. 148 This
bolstered the number of Facebook users following this type of content to
close to 30 million – which corresponds to nearly half of all followers of
vaccine misinformation across the most popular social media platform. 149
Before and throughout the pandemic, Facebook also remained the prime
social media venue for the monetization of anti-vaccine or vaccinequestioning content through implementation of “marketing funnel”
strategies.150 These strategies consist of attracting followers through an initial
channel, which then redirects users interested in further related content to
venues outside the social media platform, where they are often invited to
144

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Johnson, supra note 60, at 230-31.
146
Id. at 230 (“[A]nti-vaccination clusters dominate the main network patch in which
they are heavily entangled with a very large presence of undecided clusters.”).
147
Id.; see also Ana Santos Rutschman, Facebook’s Latest Attempt to Address Vaccine
Misinformation—And Why It’s Not Enough, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201029.23107/full/ (“Facebook’s newest
set of vaccine-specific measures. . . . leaves the problem of the circulation of vaccine
misinformation—the dissemination of inaccurate content—largely untouched and does
virtually nothing to remove the well-established sources of vaccine misinformation within
the Facebook network.”).
148
The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 135, at 14.
149
Id.
150
Id.
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purchase goods or services.151 In the context of vaccine misinformation on
Facebook, marketing funnels target users or followers of anti-vaccine pages
by inviting them to sign up for email newsletters or similar information
vehicles, through which additional vaccine- or health-related material is made
available free of charge.152 This material often consists of videos hosted on
other social media or personal webpages. 153 The final step in these funneling
strategies occurs when this free content is then linked to offers to purchase
additional content or goods. In the case of vaccines, these goods are often
associated with products perceived as “alternative medicine,” “natural” (as
opposed to vaccines, which in anti-vaccine discourse are portrayed as
chemical-dense and thus harmful) or similar signifiers.154 In some cases,
consumption of these products can be problematic: studies show that
Facebook pages enabling marketing funneling strategies in this area often
link to goods like dietary supplements, a type of product over which the FDA
has extremely tenuous oversight.155 Some of the dietary supplements known
to be offered for purchase at the end of marketing funneling strategies
initiating from anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning pages on Facebook have
been the subject of warnings issued by public-health oriented agencies, such
as the Food and Drug Administration. For instance, a dietary supplement
sometimes promoted in this context is colloidal silver (silver particles in a
liquid solution), for which the NIH maintains a warning, cautioning
consumers that “[s]cientific evidence doesn’t support the use of colloidal
silver dietary supplements for any disease or condition” and that “[i]n fact,
151
See, e.g., Anatoli Colicev et al., Modeling the Relationship Between Firm and User
Generated Content and the Stages of the Marketing Funnel, 39 INT’L J. RES. MKT. 100, 100
(2018).
152
The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 135, at 14.
153
Id. at 15.
154
See, e.g., Timothy Caulfield et al., Injecting Doubt: Responding to the Naturopathic
Anti-Vaccination Rhetoric, 4 J. LAW & BIOSCIENCES 229, 235 (2017) (citing examples of
language from naturopathic websites discussing vaccinations).
155
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2018) (defining “dietary supplement”); Roseann B. Termini
& Vincent A. Sannuti, A Look Back at the DSHEA — Over 25 Years Later: The Dangers of
a Reactionary Approach to Dietary Supplement Regulation, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J.
171, 176 (2019) (“Although many consumers are unaware, dietary supplements are not
regulated in the same manner as conventional drug products.”); Joanna K. Sax, Dietary
Supplements Are Not All Safe and Not All Food: How the Low Cost of Dietary Supplements
Preys on the Consumer, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 374, 374 (2015) (“Dietary supplements are
regulated as food, even though the safety and efficacy of some supplements are unknown.
These products are often promoted as ‘natural.’ This leads many consumers to fail to question
the supplements’ safety, and some consumers even equate ‘natural’ with safe. But, ‘natural’
does not mean safe.”); Richard E. Nowak, DSHEA'S Failure: Why a Proactive Approach to
Dietary Supplement Regulation Is Needed to Effectively Protect Consumers, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1045, 1045 (collectively highlighting the shortcomings of the current regulatory regime
for dietary supplements).
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colloidal silver can be dangerous to your health.”156
In addition to strategies that enable potential monetization of anti-vaccine
or vaccine-questioning content in mediated ways, social media also provide
a pathway for the direct monetization of this type of content, and social media
platforms themselves can benefit from this pathway. The study conducted by
the Center to Counter Digital Hate used the average revenue per person rate
used by Facebook to determine how much the company could make directly
by allowing anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning content to be shared on its
pages and groups.157 By looking at both Facebook and Facebook-owned
Instagram, the study estimated this direct revenue stream to be worth around
US $23 million.158
While the COVID-19 pandemic presented heightened challenges, it also
replicated some of the phenomena observed during social media responses to
vaccine misinformation during preceding, smaller-scale public health
crises.159 The response from Facebook is also telling from this perspective,
as pre-COVID-19 analyses of social media approaches to the spread of
vaccine misinformation should have been regarded as informative about the
shortcomings of ongoing forms of self-regulation.
As separate outbreaks of the same vaccine-preventable diseases (measles)
occurred throughout the United States in 2019, several mainstream social
media began altering their policies regarding the moderation of vaccinespecific content.160 While Pinterest adopted a suppression approach, later
paired with educational measures, 161 Facebook and other mainstream social
media elected to continue allowing users to post and share content qualifying
156
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HEALTH,
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(Apr.
2017),
https://www.nccih.nih.gov/health/colloidal-silver.
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The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 135, at 31.
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Id.
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See Broniatowski, supra note 30 (“The ‘Disneyland’ measles outbreak drew vaccine
opposition into the political mainstream, followed by promotional campaigns conducted in
pages framing vaccine refusal as a civil right. Political mobilization in state-focused pages
followed in 2019.”).
160
See Rachel Becker, Facebook outlines plans to curb anti-vax conspiracy theories,
THE VERGE (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/7/18255107/facebook-antivaccine-misinformation-measles-outbreaks-group-page-recommendations-removal
(“Facebook announced today that it will remove groups and pages that share anti-vaccine
misinformation from its recommendations. The company also pledged that it will stop
allowing advertisers to target people who Facebook’s advertising algorithm identifies as
interested in ‘vaccine controversies.’”); Julia Belluz, Facebook, Pinterest, and YouTube are
cracking down on fake vaccine news, VOX (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/1/
18244384/measles-outbreak-vaccine-washington (“Facebook is changing how users see
vaccine content — part of an ongoing effort by social platforms to correct, block, and
minimize vaccine misinformation amid a record measles outbreak.”).
161
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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as vaccine misinformation.162 Data show that, under a policy that left most of
the sources of vaccine misinformation available on Facebook untouched,
anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning clusters grew exponentially more than
other clusters.163 The most active anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning clusters
grew by more than 300%.164 By contrast, not a single pro-vaccine cluster
exceeded a 100% increase in growth, with most growth rates for pro-vaccine
clusters averaging less than 50%.165 No similarly comprehensive data are yet
available for other mainstream social media, although emerging studies
indicate that social media that do not attempt to restrict anti-vaccine and
vaccine-questioning content, opting primarily for educational approaches, are
unlikely to curb the spread of vaccine misinformation. 166
The experience with the moderation of vaccine content before the
pandemic also indicated that, even when companies announce policies that
seemingly restrict the posting or sharing of vaccine misinformation, the
actual effects of these policies can be minimal.167 Once again, the case of
Facebook is illuminating. In October 2020, the company announced that it
would ratchet up its vaccine misinformation policy as part of an effort
primarily designed to promote accurate information on vaccines in
collaboration with public health agencies and other organizations. 168 As flu
season was approaching, the new policy was built around the publicization
of information about flu vaccines, touching indirectly on the possibility of
COVID-19 vaccines becoming available shortly.169 Per the new policy,
Facebook would start promoting content about seasonal flu vaccines
provided by credible organization, as well as providing users with sharable
vaccination reminders.170 At the same time, the company announced that the
162

Broniatowski, supra note 30, at S312; Belluz, supra note 160.
Johnson, supra note 60, at 231.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.; see also Beckett, supra note 137 (“The social network says it has limited the
reach of some prominent anti-vaxx Facebook pages, and that few people are seeing some of
the latest coronavirus misinformation. But misinformation experts say the platform’s actions
amount to far too little, too late.”).
167
See Johnson, supra note 60, at 230 (“Social media companies are struggling to control
online health dis- and misinformation, for example, during the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020.”); Rutschman, supra note 147 (“Facebook’s newest set of vaccine-specific
measures . . . leaves the problem of the circulation of vaccine misinformation—the
dissemination of inaccurate content—largely untouched and does virtually nothing to
remove the well-established sources of vaccine misinformation within the Facebook
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Kang-Xing Jin et al., Supporting Public Health Experts’ Vaccine Efforts, FACEBOOK
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policy would also include the rejection of ads explicitly “discouraging people
from getting vaccinated.”171
Although the new policy concerning ads appears to fall under—and was
described as—a suppression-like approach, in practice it was extremely
limited.172 The policy created a very broad exception to the prohibition on
anti-vaccine ads, by continuing to allow ads as long as they can be construed
as advocating “for or against legislation or government policies around
vaccines – including a COVID-19 vaccine.” 173 Facebook coupled the
exceptional approach for these ads with a screening mechanism it deploys to
moderate certain categories of speech, including political speech: the
company screens the ad before making it available, and adds a label to the ad
identifying who paid for it.174 Similarly, the revised policy did not cover
private pages sharing vaccine-related content on Facebook, whether pro- or
anti-vaccine, effectively leaving the major Facebook-specific fora for the
propagation of vaccine misinformation untouched. 175
Although the findings summarized in this section are based on data and
studies focused on Facebook—reflecting a particular interest in the company,
given its disproportionately large footprint in enabling online vaccine
discourses—they are not restricted to Facebook. 176 They illustrate the norm,
with suppression approaches like the one adopted by Pinterest being the
exception. The current social media environment is therefore characterized
by self-regulatory approaches to the moderation of vaccine-related content
that do not remove or meaningfully isolate the sources of misinformation. As
further discussed below, several commentators have begun to call for more
uniformly stringent approaches to vaccine-specific misinformation
circulating across social media, a problem to which the Essay now turns.

171

Id.
Rutschman, supra note 147.
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Id.
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See id. (describing the policy for vaccine-related ads as adopted in October 2020);
see also FACEBOOK, Get Authorized to Run Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics,
(Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051?id=288762101
909005&recommended_by=253606115253606 (displaying the most recent embodiment of
the overall policy for ads relating to political and electoral content, as well as certain types
of social debates).
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Johnson, supra note 60, at 230.
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Claire Wardle & Eric Singerman, Too Little, Too Late: Social Media Companies’
Failure to Tackle Vaccine Misinformation Poses a Real Threat, 372 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1
(2021); see also Belluz, supra note 160 (“Facebook and Twitter and Google (which owns
YouTube) have stated that they will take more action against false and misleading
information about COVID-19 vaccines. This is undeniably positive, but these policy updates
will not cover many types of posts that have the potential to lead to vaccine hesitancy.”).
172

JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION

58

[Vol. 4:1

IV. CURBING VACCINE MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION:
THE CASE FOR MORE STRINGENT SOFT-LAW APPROACHES
The Essay now considers potential ways of adding stringency to ongoing
modes of self-regulation of vaccine misinformation and explores pathways to
build cooperative monitoring and mutual assistance networks in this area.
From a prescriptive perspective – and despite the limitations of ongoing
modes of self-regulation, as described in Part III – the Essay focuses on
improving self-regulation frameworks instead of exploring other types of
regulation of vaccine content disseminated through social media for several
reasons.
First, the regulation of speech about vaccines, if performed outside the
context of self-regulatory approaches, raises significant legal issues. Because
social media platforms are private actors, self-regulation as practiced in
recent years largely escapes First Amendment scrutiny, which places the bulk
of its limitations on the regulation of speech by government actors.177
Proposals shifting the focus from self-regulation to other modes of regulating
vaccine-related speech on social media would potentially run into First
Amendment hurdles. Seeking to add stringency to the status quo by shifting
away from self-regulation would potentially amount to imposing restrictions
on speech based on its content. Content-based speech restrictions have long
been understood as presumptively invalid178 and, in light of both historical
patterns and recent caselaw,179 it seems that, at a minimum, proposals to
177

U.S. CONST. amend. I. As Dawn Carla Nunziato has recently explained, the ways in
which social media has responded to both political and health-related misinformation has
been consistent with both substantive and procedural First Amendment safeguards applicable
to private actors, as well as safeguards established elsewhere (e.g., by providing prior notice
before restricting speech, social media has complied with due process requirements). See
Dawn Carla Nunziato, Misinformation Mayhem: Social Media Platforms’ Efforts to Combat
Medical and Political Misinformation, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 32, 35–36 (2020)
(“[A]pproaches undertaken by the major social media platforms are generally consistent with
First Amendment values, both the substantive values in terms of what constitutes protected
and unprotected speech, and the procedural values, in terms of process accorded to users
whose speech is restricted or otherwise subject to action by the platforms.”).
178
See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 115 (1991) (“A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it
imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.”); Ashcroft v.
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution demands that
content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid.”).
179
See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992) (“A few limited categories of
speech . . . may be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content.”); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (“We hold that the rule of law applied by
the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide safeguards for freedom
of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”);
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impose restrictions on vaccine-related speech on social media are likely to
face close (and potentially harsh) constitutional scrutiny – a process that is
both protracted in time and socially polarizing. The Essay is agnostic on the
merits, legality or even desirability of regulating vaccine-related speech
through instruments only available outside the context of self-regulation – it
merely takes an approach that favors expediency in the face of the growing
footprint left by vaccine misinformation circulating on social media,
particularly against the backdrop of a pandemic during which levels of
vaccine hesitancy have remained at problematic levels.
Therefore, the Essay focuses on measures that can be adopted in the shortterm to improve existing, albeit imperfect, self-regulatory modes of
addressing the problems posed by the propagation of vaccine misinformation
through social media. Part IV.A looks at recent steps taken by the European
Union in response to the proliferation of online misinformation—surveying
the frameworks adopted before the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as changes
made or proposed in direct response to the growth of misinformation during
the pandemic. Although largely reliant on a soft law approach—through the
adoption of non-binding instruments180— European regulators succeeded in
creating the first large-scale framework for the regulation of misinformation
propagated through social media, as well as in attracting most mainstream
social media as signatories.181 While the framework, which was designed to
address misinformation in general, has had limited success in curbing the
spread of vaccine misinformation, Part IV. B argues that the basic features of
this framework can and should be adapted to respond to specific challenges
posed by vaccine misinformation. The Essay concludes by suggesting several
starting points in the creation of such a tailored framework.
A. A Starting Point: Expanding the Existing Regulatory and Institutional
Infrastructure
The steps taken by the European Union to curb the growth of
misinformation and disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic built on
pre-existing soft law frameworks targeting misinformation and
Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973) (“[W]e now confine the permissible scope of
such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.”); United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (“[F]alsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech
outside the First Amendment.”).
180
See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, LEGALLY BINDING VERSUS NON-LEGALLY BINDING
INSTRUMENTS, TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 155 (Scott Barrett
et al. eds., 2015) (“[C]onfident assertions, one way or the other, on the degree to which the
legally binding nature of the Paris agreement does or does not matter seem unwarranted.”).
181
See infra note 213 and accompanying text (noting the absence of WhatsApp and
TikTok).
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disinformation at large. In 2015, following the reporting of online
disinformation campaigns originating in Russia, the European Council
established an ad hoc taskforce—the East Strategic Communication Task
Force182—and directed different groups to gather information, develop best
practices and collaborate with European Union institutions, international
organizations and other stakeholders across areas impacted by
misinformation and disinformation.183 Even though the first steps taken by
the European Union were driven in large part by concerns and disinformation
in connection with upcoming elections,184 the resulting action plan, published
in 2018, provided a general-purpose framework to address disinformation
problems affecting both the European Union as a whole and individual
member-states.185 Specifically, the Action Plan Against Disinformation
focused on disinformation spread through online channels and led to the
development and adoption of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the
creation of the European Union Observatory Against Disinformation and of
several educational initiatives on media and online literacy. 186
The Code of Practice on Disinformation has been hailed as marking the
“first time worldwide that industry has agreed, on a voluntary basis, to selfregulatory standards to fight disinformation.” 187 It provides definitional
clarity about what constitutes disinformation in the online environment;
enunciates commitments adopted by industry signatories (which included
several, although not all, of the mainstream social media platforms); and
includes an annex describing a set of best practices to be adopted by industry,
linking each recommended practice to a policy adopted by a specific social
media platform, search engine or other online actor.188
182

See EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, Questions and Answers about the East
StratCom Task Force (Dec. 5, 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east-stratcom-task-force_en (“The Task
Force was set up to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns.”).
183
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Action Plan against Disinformation, EUR. COMM’N 1 (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/action-plan-against-disinformation.
184
Id. at 1-2.
185
Id. at 1.
186
EUR. UNION DISINFORMATION LAB, Action Plan Against Disinformation,
https://www.disinfo.eu/resources/eu-actions/other-eu-initiatives/.
187
EUR. COMM’N, Code of Practice on Disinformation [hereinafter Code of Practice on
Disinformation], https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/code-practice-disinformation
(last updated May 28, 2021).
188
Id.; see also EUR. COMM’N, Code of Practice on Disinformation, Annex II
[hereinafter
Code
of
Practice
Annex
II],
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2018-29/annex-tomsf-cop-on-disinformation-13-07-99F63CFE-A8CE-39BF687C68BFC0668569_53544.
pdf.
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The Code defines disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading
information” meeting two cumulative criteria: first, it refers to content
“created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally
deceive the public”; and second, such content “may cause public harm.”189
Importantly, the Code defines public harm in the context of the spread of
online disinformation as “threats to democratic political and policymaking
processes as well as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens’
health, the environment or security.” 190 The inclusion of harms to public or
individual health is especially relevant for debates on how to best address the
specific problems caused by vaccine- and health-related misinformation.
Still at the definitional level, the Code also expressly recognizes
categories that fall outside the purview of ongoing efforts undertaken by the
European Union to curb the spread of disinformation in the online
environment. It states that the operational concept of disinformation adopted
by signatories of the Code “does not include misleading advertising,
reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and
commentary, and is without prejudice to binding legal obligations, selfregulatory advertising codes, and standards regarding misleading
advertising.”191
The requirements set forth by the Code range from obligations relative to
the placement of advertisements (such as allowing for third-party verification
of content and using verification tools)192 to the prioritization of the
promotion of accurate information to the detriment of misinformation. 193 To
monitor actual adoption of these obligations, the Code required signatories to
provide annual updates on their policies and practices, 194 and established a
one-year assessment period.195 Annex II of the Code currently complements
this framework through a fourteen-page document providing language that
develops each of the commitments articulated in the Code into discrete best
practices.196 The Annex further provides a link next to each best practice
directing readers to actual policies adopted by signatories and currently in
place.197
The self-regulation framework laid out by the Code was complemented
by the establishment of the European Union Observatory Against

189

Code of Practice on Disinformation, supra note 187, Preamble.
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at I, II.A.
193
Id. at II.D.
194
Id. at II.E., III.
195
Id. at III.
196
Code of Practice Annex II, supra note 188.
197
Id.
190
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Disinformation.198 The Observatory collects information on disinformation,
publishes reports, organizes educational events (such as webinars), publishes
informational materials (such as toolkits on topics like data intelligence199)
and provides free fact checking technology to fact checkers, media
organizations, researchers, social media and policy makers interested in
collaborating with the Observatory. 200
And finally, the educational portion of the European Union’s strategy to
curb disinformation was further developed through a 2018 amendment to the
2010 Media Directive.201 While directives are binding legal instruments
under European law202 and hence escape the roster of soft law mechanisms
surveyed in this section, it is worth noting here that it showcases how the
European Union embedded a part (albeit small) of its programmatic response
to online disinformation into a hard law instrument.
Drawing on this pre-existing framework, the European Union noted that
the growth of online misinformation and disinformation during the COVID19 pandemic required the adoption of more stringent measures to monitor,
report and curb the spread of misinformation—particularly in cases in which
the promotion of inaccurate content could lead to harms to individual or
public health.203 In June 2020, the European Commission issued a
198

EUR.
UNION
OBSERVATORY
AGAINST
DISINFORMATION,
https://www.disinfobservatory.org (last visited June 1, 2021).
199
Id.; see also SOCIAL OBSERVATORY FOR DISINFORMATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA
ANALYSIS, D3.3 Data Intelligence Toolkit Description, 5 (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.disinfobservatory.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/D3.3-Data-Inteligencetoolkit-description.pdf (“In this document, we focus on the algorithmic and technological
engine of the platform: a data-driven social disinformation toolbox named DisInfoNet that
supports the users of the SOMA platform in collecting and processing social media data with
the goal of tracking popular and controversial contents, understanding the dynamics of (fake)
news dissemination in social media, and identifying the origin and the broadcasters of false
information.”).
200
SOCIAL OBSERVATORY FOR DISINFORMATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS, supra
note 199, at 5.
201
Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Nov. 14,
2018), amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the
Provision of Audiovisual Media Services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in View
of Changing Market Realities, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj.
202
See e.g., EUR. UNION, Regulations, Directives and Other Acts,
https://europa.eu/european-union/law/legal-acts_en (last visited June 1, 2021) (“A
‘directive’ is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve.”).
203
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Tackling COVID-19 Disinformation - Getting the Facts Right, EUR. COMM’N 1 (Jun. 10,
2020) [hereinafter Tackling COVID-19 Disinformation - Getting the Facts Right],
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0008.
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Communication about disinformation in the context of the pandemic. 204 The
Communication framed the proliferation of misinformation and
disinformation as an “infodemic,”205 a term used to highlight “the perils of
misinformation phenomena during the management of disease outbreaks.” 206
It then called for a better calibration of response to misinformation and
disinformation, and it urged stakeholders to distinguish “between illegal
content, as defined by law, and content that is harmful but not illegal.” 207
Noting that efforts should focus on cases in which there is “intention to
deceive or cause public harm, or to make economic gain,” the
Communication then called for “all parts of society” to be involved in a more
robust response to the infodemic.208 The specific measures proposed by the
European Commission included the development of better monitoring and
reporting channels both within the European Union (between member-states,
as well as between member-states and European regulators) 209 and between
the European Union and regional or international players. 210 At the regional
level, the European Union singled out the Western Balkans and Africa as its
“immediate neighbourhood,” and gave priority status to collaborations with
countries in these areas.211
The Communication also requested more transparency from social media
platforms in the implementation of their misinformation and disinformation
policies, and argued that the monitoring and reporting mechanisms
established in the Code of Practice on Disinformation should apply to nonsignatories.212 This proposal specifically reacted to the absence of prominent
social media from the self-regulation framework created by the Code, with
the Commission singling out WhatsApp and TikTok.213 However, the
204

Id.
Id. The use of the concept of “infodemic” matches conceptual approaches adopted
by multiple international institutions. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Managing the COVID-19
Infodemic: Promoting Healthy Behaviours and Mitigating the Harm from Misinformation
and Disinformation (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/23-09-2020managing-the-covid-19-infodemic-promoting-healthy-behaviours-and-mitigating-theharm-from-misinformation-and-disinformation (providing a statement from several
international organizations, including several institutions affiliated with the United Nations).
206
Matteo Cinelli et al., The COVID-19 social media infodemic, 10 NATURE SCI. REP.
1, 1 (Oct. 6, 2020) https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-73510-5; see also J.
Zarocostas, How to Fight an Infodemic, 395 LANCET 676, 676 (2020) (noting the
proliferation of the word “infodemic” to describe the spread of misinformation).
207
Tackling COVID-19 Disinformation - Getting the Facts Right, supra note 203, at 3.
208
Id. at 3-4.
209
Id. at 5-6.
210
Id. at 5-7.
211
Id. at 6-7.
212
Id. at 8.
213
Id.
205
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Communication was silent on how a non-binding framework could be
extended to non-signatories or, alternatively, how non-signatories could be
persuaded to self-regulate under the European framework.
Additional proposed measures included the allocation of more resources
towards fact-checking214 and educational campaigns.215 Moreover, noting the
exponential growth of health-related misinformation and disinformation
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Communication underscored how some
aspects of disinformation can be dealt with through established bodies of law,
particularly when monetization of health-related disinformation occurs
through the offer to sell products for which there is very little to no regulatory
oversight:
Manipulation, deceptive marketing techniques, fraud, and scams
exploit fears in order to sell unnecessary, ineffective and potentially
dangerous products under false health claims, or to lure consumers into
buying products at exorbitant prices. Whilst this kind of content may
contain disinformation, if it infringes the consumers’ acquis [common
rights and obligations binding all E.U. member states] it is illegal
content and requires a different response, under consumers’ protection
laws and by competent authorities.216

In response to this problem, the Commission proposed increasing funding
for the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network, a network of national
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws. 217
The Network was established in 2007 to allow national authorities to share
best practices and to function as a “mutual assistance mechanism.”218
European regulations make the provision of assistance mandatory through
timely compliance with information requests and requests to assist with
enforcement measures, as well as the obligation to alert the European
Commission and other member states when a breach occurs. 219 Moreover,
214

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 13-14.
216
Id. at 14.
217
Id. at 15; see also EUR. COMM’N, Consumer Protection Cooperation Network,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcementconsumer-protection/consumer-protection-cooperation-network_en (last visited June 13,
2021) (“Thanks to the updated Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (EU)
2017/2394, national authorities now have stronger powers to detect irregularities and take
speedy action against rogue traders. If national consumer authorities work together at EU
level, they save taxpayers’ money.”).
218
EUR. COMM’N, Single Market Scoreboard: Consumer Protection Cooperation
(CPC): Reporting period: 01/2018 – 12/2018, at 2 [hereinafter Single Market Scoreboard],
https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/_docs/2018/cpc/2018-scoreboard-cpc_en
.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2021).
219
Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer
215
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Network engages in area-specific website monitoring, periodically
conducting “sweeps,” systematic screenings of websites in a given sector
“offering fixed/mobile phone, internet, audio and video streaming
services.”220 The first sweep, conducted in 2017, monitored 207 websites and
found 163 violations of European consumer law. 221 For the following sweeps,
the Network partnered with authorities in countries outside the European
Union (Iceland and Norway) to expand the reach of its monitoring activities,
and increased the number of websites being monitored (560 in 2018 and 481
in 2019).222
Most recently, in late January 2021, the European Union called for greater
efforts to nudge social media to begin de-monetizing disinformation. 223 The
European Commission is currently pondering the adoption of specific
measures to achieve this goal, including potential additions to the Digital
Services Act,224 a set of reforms—currently in draft form—to the European
laws regulating the activity of online platforms (a category that includes, but
is not limited to, social media platforms). 225
B. Incorporating Tools to Address Vaccine-specific Misinformation and
Disinformation
The combined reliance on soft law and social media voluntarism as the
primary way of curbing the escalation of misinformation circulating online
has so far failed to meaningfully address the problems posed by the
propagation of vaccine-specific content—and especially inaccurate vaccine
content, as described in Part III. Yet, ongoing soft law frameworks applicable
to misinformation in general provide several important clues on how to
develop monitoring and response mechanisms tailored to the characteristics
Protection Laws and Repealing Regulation, 2017 O.J. (L 345) 1-26, https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj.
220
Single Market Scoreboard, supra note 218, at 3-5.
221
Id. at 4.
222
Id.; see also EUR. COMM’N, Single Market Scoreboard: Consumer Protection
Cooperation (CPC): Reporting period: 01/2019 – 12/2019, https://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/consumer_protection_coope
ration_network/index_en.htm (last visited June 1, 2021) (“[T]he CPC authorities in 27
countries (25 EU countries, Norway and Iceland) screened 481 websites selling clothing and
footwear, furniture, household items and appliances.”).
223
Samuel Stolton, EU Commission Presses Platforms to De-Monetise Disinformation,
EURACTIV (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/eu-commissionpresses-platforms-to-de-monetise-disinformation.
224
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single
Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC,
ECOM/2020/825, Eur. Comm’n, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=
1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN (last visited June 1, 2021).
225
Id.
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of, and problems posed by, vaccine-specific misinformation. The Essay sets
forth three arguments in support of creating a tailored system through soft
law and self-regulation as opposed to other types of interventions. It then
explains how this system could be developed to target vaccine
misinformation.
First, creating a framework that specifically targets vaccine
misinformation propagated through social media is necessary in light of the
idiosyncrasies of the vaccine misinformation ecosystem, as social media
communities active in vaccine debates operate in highly specialized ways visà-vis communities engaged in debates focused on other themes. Additionally,
a tailored framework is necessary because of the specific challenges that
consumption of vaccine misinformation may pose to individual and public
health. Exposure to vaccine misinformation on social media has been linked
with the growth of skepticism towards vaccines, 226 the increase in vaccination
delays227 and a decrease in vaccination rates.228 Research has also suggested
that repeated exposure to vaccine misinformation on social media is likely to
increase vaccine hesitancy,229 which in turn may lead individuals to skip or
unnecessarily delay receiving a vaccine, or having their children
vaccinated.230 The failure of current approaches in curbing the expansion of
vaccine misinformation through loosely designed self-regulatory
frameworks, allied to the health-related problems connected with
consumption of vaccine misinformation circulating on social media, suggests
that additional steps are necessary—and that future interventions should take
226

Broniatowski et al., supra note 30, at S312.
Id.; see also Daniel Jolley & Karen M. Douglas, The effects of Anti-Vaccine
Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions, PLOS ONE, Feb. 2014, at 2 (describing how
misinformation decreases overall vaccination rates, as shown in two studies). See generally
Dubé, supra note 25.
228
Broniatowski et al., supra note 30, at S312.
229
Id.; see also Gordon Pennycook et al., Prior Exposure Increases Perceived Accuracy
of Fake News, 147 J. EXP. PSYCH. GEN. 1865, 1865 (2018) (surveying the problem of
repeated exposure to misinformation on a general level).
230
See Alessandro Facciolà et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: An Overview on Parents’
Opinions About Vaccination and Possible Reasons of Vaccine Refusal, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH
RES. 13, 17 (2019) (“The argument of the vaccine hesitancy is particularly important for
public health because, due to the parents’ refusal to vaccine their children, we have assisted
in last years to the recruitment of VPDs in many countries. This refusal is due especially to
a fear about potential side effects of vaccines. However, many studies have shown that
vaccines are sure and efficacies.”). But see Ángel V. Jiménez et al., No Evidence That
Omission and Confirmation Biases Affect the Perception and Recall of Vaccine-Related
Information, PLOS ONE, Mar. 2020, at 1 (“Contrary to the hypotheses, perceptions of severity
and the recall of symptoms/side effects were not associated with experimental condition,
failing to support the omission bias, nor did they interact with attitudes towards vaccines,
failing to support the confirmation bias. This cast doubt on the possibility that the spread of
anti-vaccination claims can be explained by these particular universal cognitive biases.”).
227
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into greater account the features of vaccine-specific misinformation that
differentiate it from other types of misinformation.
Second, and in spite of the failures noted above, 231 building a framework
tailored to vaccine misinformation is best accomplished through continued
reliance on soft law as a mechanism to achieve more stringency in selfregulation, rather than through interventions entailing the use of hard law
mechanisms. A shift towards the adoption of binding legal mechanisms can
provide a homogenous solution—by requiring that all social media
implement the same measures; impose a stringent approach to the moderation
of vaccine-related content—such as default suppression approaches that
extend to private groups or pages within social media, coupled with the
suppression of monetization channels;232 and create an environment that
facilitates enforcement actions—by establishing actionable behaviors and
corresponding consequences. Yet, such a shift towards hard law would likely
be met with several political economy hurdles and may even be
counterproductive in light of the dynamics of contemporary anti-vaccine and
vaccine-questioning discourses. On the political economy side of things,
passing legislation at the domestic level is a time-consuming and politically
fraught endeavor. Moreover, legislation imposing restrictions on contentbased speech is bound to face protracted scrutiny and, depending on the
specific embodiments of these restrictions, be of dubious legality—for
instance, under long-held First Amendment jurisprudence in the United
States, which has traditionally approached content-based restrictions as
presumptively invalid233 and created very few permissible categorical
exceptions.234 If hard law approaches were instead (or complementary)
adopted at the transnational level, time and buy-in problems would also likely
occur, as the negotiation of treaties and other multi-lateral agreements is
notoriously lengthy, both procedurally and due to the need to harmonize
competing geopolitical interests in areas often adjacent to the one being
regulated.
In addition to political economy problems, singling out vaccine-related
speech as exceptional may be counterproductive by increasing animosity
towards government interventions in the ideologically fraught area of
vaccines.235 As such, it can fuel the instrumentalization of anti-vaccine and
231

See supra Part III.A (summarizing the shortcomings of current self-regulatory
approaches to vaccine misinformation).
232
See infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text.
233
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
115 (1991); Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
234
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709
(2012).
235
See, e.g., Lucas B. Stolle et al., Fact vs Fallacy: The Anti-Vaccine Discussion
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vaccine-questioning discourses—in particular, the strands of these discourses
that border on conspiracy theories according to which the government, or
representatives thereof, are portrayed as promoting semi-hidden vaccination
agendas in multiple ways, including through the suppression of dissenting
voices in vaccine debates.236 This is a problem that the use of soft law cannot
fully address—although, by interposing social media and other entities (such
as monitoring organizations) in the regulation of content related to vaccines,
it may lessen perceived links between efforts to curb vaccine-specific
misinformation and the role of the government in vaccine policy.
Against this backdrop, the third argument in favor of bolstering current
frameworks for social media self-regulation of vaccine misinformation relies
on the fact that there is already an incipient regulatory framework in place
that can be further tailored to specific needs in this area. The approach taken
by the European Union—which resulted in the current, albeit insufficient,
self-regulation framework adopted by social media—provides some clues on
how to create a tailored and potentially more stringent regime targeting
vaccine misinformation. To begin with, a framework akin to the Code of
Practice on Disinformation can and should be developed for vaccine
misinformation: a “Code of Practice on Vaccine Misinformation,” providing
conceptual clarity on what constitute both vaccine misinformation and
vaccine disinformation; articulating commitments to be adopted by industry;
and providing “best practice” language that can be incorporated into social
media vaccine-specific policies.237
While creating a code does not translate into automatic industry adoption
of the proposed framework, it can have an important nudging effect,
particularly in light of current concerns about, and goodwill towards,
vaccines and vaccination campaigns in the context of a global pandemic.
Bargaining with social media to persuade them to adopt more stringent forms
of moderation of vaccine content (i.e., defaulting to suppression approaches
that may include blocking private groups spreading vaccine-specific
misinformation) disrupts fewer established interests than wider approaches.
Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has not only reawakened public
perceptions about the public health value of vaccines. It has also called
attention to the fact that scientists have long called attention to the likely
increasing frequency at which pandemics or large-scale epidemics are likely

Reloaded, 37 ADV. THER. 4481, 4484 (2020) (noting that “government institutions” are
linked to sentiment of hesitancy).
236
Jon D. Lee, The Utter Familiarity of Even the Strangest Vaccine Conspiracy
Theories, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/
01/familiarity-strangest-vaccine-conspiracy-theories/617572/.
237
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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to occur in the near future.238 Because the development and deployment of
vaccines is predicted to play an important role in the response to these events,
self-regulating actors may be more willing to adopt more stringent
frameworks in this area as opposed to in connection with misinformation in
general.
In addition to a more stringent regulatory framework, there is also a need
for greater institutional monitoring dedicated to vaccine-specific
misinformation circulating in the social media environment. Creation of an
observatory-like structure in the United States, potentially modeled after the
Observatory Against Disinformation established by the European Union and
focused exclusively on vaccine misinformation,239 would contribute to the
collection and analytical treatment of data on the idiosyncrasies of this subtype of misinformation. A vaccine misinformation observatory can also play
important informative and educational roles, similar to the ones currently
played by the Observatory Against Disinformation in its general-purpose
approach to disinformation. Lastly, a dedicated observatory can also provide
a basic technological infrastructure, in the form of screening tools that can be
used by fact-checkers and other monitoring agents—and even social media
themselves—operating in the vaccine misinformation ecosystem. 240
Still at the institutional level, part of the European response to the surge
of activity qualifying as disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic
hinged on broadening its cooperation both within member-states and
externally.241 A tailored response to vaccine misinformation could benefit
from the formation of monitoring networks with mutual assistance protocols
(or even obligations, as in the case of the E.U. Consumer Protection
Cooperation Network) dedicated to the monitoring of, and data sharing on,
vaccine misinformation.242 These networks can be established at the national
or transnational level (or both). In addition to focusing only geographical
“immediate neighborhoods” as the European Union did, some countries may
consider the formation of “language neighborhoods.” For instance, the
United States might benefit from forming monitoring networks with other
English-speaking countries. Conversely, given the shortcomings of current
screening practices when misinformation circulates in languages other than
English,243 non-English speaking countries may stand to gain from
cooperating with countries where large segments of the population speak the
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same language, or proximate languages.
The steps outlined above—already adopted to some extent in Europe,
albeit without a specific focus on vaccine misinformation, and with less
stringent self-regulatory standards than the ones proposed here—do not
require the commitment of extensive infrastructure or monetary
commitments. At a time when the programmatic role of vaccination in
popular discourse has changed dramatically, the adoption of more stringent
self-regulatory frameworks likely faces fewer political economy constraints
than ever before. Moreover, the development of stronger monitoring and
cooperation frameworks designed to address this particular sub-set of
misinformation aligns with public health and consumer protection goals
acknowledged—at least nominally—by policymakers and regulators in
several countries, including the United States.
The steps proposed here are also admittedly limited. On the one hand,
they do not move the needle on the need for voluntary industry commitment
if the regulation of vaccine misinformation is to be harmonized across social
media—and especially when such harmonization entails the adoption of more
stringent paradigms. On the other hand, they still require complementary
interventions in other areas, such as the development of more accurate
algorithms and other screening tools.244 Yet, on balance, they can contribute
to the formation of better monitoring and response frameworks attuned to the
specific problems posed by vaccine misinformation; drive the improvement
of current best practices; and, at a minimum, exert pressure on mainstream
social media for the adoption of more homogenous or stringent selfregulatory frameworks—or, ideally, both.
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